Passengers | Luis Katigbak

You liked bus rides, I remember that much. I thought you were nuts when you first told me that, all economic reasons aside, you preferred riding buses to taking taxis. I chalked it up to your sheltered upbringing- your overly protective parents had not allowed you to take public transportation until your were twenty years old. I supposed that, even after four years, the novelty had not worn off yet.

Taxis afforded us a bit more privacy, I reasoned. We could sit comfortably, snuggle a little, and not worry about the conductor not giving us change, or someone squeezing unto the seat with us, or having to jostle our way through a people-packed aisle when it was time to get down. “But it’s different,” you insisted. “Yes,” I agreed, “and in this case, ‘different’ means ‘better’.” For that remark, you accused me- not without justification or amusement- of being small-minded and smug. It took me a while to realize that you were right and I was wrong. As per usual.

As I write this, I have to wonder-- why do we remember the things we remember? Not that all I’ve retained of our time together are bus rides and bite-sized arguments. My theory is that people, emotional masochists aside, tend to just recall things that won’t sting too much, that are easier to think about or explain, given time and distance.

You know, once in a while, I’ll start to remember something; a scene will start to fade into view. An evening in a dimly lit club, with a live band and oblivious waiters. An afternoon in a vacant office, sunlight slivering through closed blinds. A morning meeting in Mini Stop. But before the two of us walk into the frame, before the audio comes on or any sort of action begins, I’ll stop, I’ll shut off the film reel in my mind, because I know that watching those particular memories is not going to do me any good. Quite the opposite, in fact.

But I can think of you and me on a bus and t doesn’t hurt, it’s even pleasant, to remember you sitting next to me, occasionally resting the side of your head on my shoulder; to remember the chill of the air conditioner, the juddering motion as we sped through the evening, the look-at-me graffiti scrawled on the seat in front of us, the grime-blue and sick-green bus tickets folded and jammed into the gaps of that same seat, even the incessant and annoying pseudo-techno medley that almost always serves as the official soundtrack for Metro Manila buses.

I recall how the urban landscape blurring past our bus window would give us endless fodder for conversations, inane or otherwise. Remember that little store called “Manly Mart,” in Cubao, just across the Araneta Coliseum? We wondered: did you have to be Manly with a capital M to shop there? Would they bar scrawny nerds at the door? Or was that where one went purchase men? Then there was the time we were stuck in traffic on East Avenue, and you told me about the day you visited a friend who was confined at the medical center there, about the feeling of desolation the place gave you- the depressing green tiles on the hallways, and the constellations of cigarette butts that you could see from your friend’s hospital room window, spread out on the blackened rooftop of a lower floor.

And one time, instead of the usual techno-dreck, the bus we were riding was playing ‘80s hits on its sound system. This started us on a conversation that encompassed our high school years ( the unsurpassed cruelty of cliques and certain teachers), our most embarrassing hairstyles ever (frizzy and poodle-like, in your case: a mullet, in mine) and of course music. “Turn Back the Clock,” that sappy nostalgic tune, started playing, and I got absurdly sentimental. It occurred to me that even though we had been out for a few months, we didn’t have ‘song’ yet to call our own. I remarked upon this fact. You remained silent. And when I remarked upon your silence, you said “I’m holding out for a better song.”

I could hardly blame you. Unfortunately, it was too late; the concept, and the moment, stuck, and from that point on, whenever we heard “Turn Back the Clock” somewhere- in a mall, or on classic flashback nights on the radio, we would look at each other and grimace affectionately.

And almost always, on these bus rides, I would tell you about my latest daydream, my latest idyllic scenario involving us. I was always dreaming up situations and setups where our being together was not so difficult, where your parents did not hate my guts and regulate our meetings every step of the way, where your friends and mine were more understanding and accepting of what we had, where our lives seemed to be heading in the same direction. Foreign lands, desert islands, even alien planets or other time periods might be involved in these scenarios. You said that you always liked hearing me described them, and I was only too happy to oblige.

Of course, our city being the sprawling cutthroat traffic-tangled mess that it is, there were times when we just couldn’t get any sort of ride at all- times when taxis would speed by, ignoring our energetic gesticulations, times when the buses stuffed to bursting with wriggling commuters. During such times, I would wish I had a car. Not that I would even have known how to operate one. “You should learn how to drive,” you once told me. “so you can pick me up, and I can wear skirts when we go out…” You leaned a bit closer: “Short skirts,” you stressed.

“That’s a good way to get killed,” I said. “Distract me while I’m driving. Like you’re not distracting me enough in jeans.”

“You’re sweet,” you said, punching my arm. (I miss that way you used to do me violence: punching my arm, pinching my cheek, pretending to strangle me. I suppose if I thought about it deeply enough, these gestures might seem more disturbing than endearing, so I’m happy that I didn’t.) “But, really,” you said, “are you ever going to learn how to drive? You’re almost thirty.”

I gently reminded you that I was several years away from turning thirty, and called into question your arithmetic skills. I received another punch in response, just as I thought I would.

I wonder if you’d be amused to learn that I know how to drive now. I drive a beat-up box-type Lancer that’s almost as old as my sister, who is no entering her freshman college year in La Salle. Barring unforeseen circumstances, I don’t suppose I’ll ever ride a bus in Metro Manila ever again. To me those careening hunks of metal no longer represent cheap rides to Galleria. No, they are now The Enemy, who must be outmaneuvered, outfoxed, overtaken.

Sometimes, though, when I’m on the road, I’ll pass an air-conditioned southbound bus, and wonder if you’re on it. I just know that one of these days, I’ll be drifting , and wondering , and that same bus I’m wondering about is going to take advantage of my being distracted, and slam into me and crush me like a beer can.

When that happens, I can only hope that you actually will be on that bus, and you’ll rush down, and while my blood slowly stained the asphalt underneath me, you would support my injured neck and I would sing you a few line of “Turn Back the Clock,” and tell you my latest daydream about us, the one where we meet again decades from now in an old folks’ home or a free Tai Chi session at the park and we’ll both be gray and forgetful, so forgetful that we won’t even be able to remember why we ever broke up in the first place. And we’ll get back together, our passion more fiery than ever before, and disgust our respective grandchildren with our uncontrollable public displays of tongue-kissing. “It’s easier when you don’t have any teeth anymore,” we’ll explain.

Yeah, I know. It may be time to seek psychiatric help.

Anyway. Would you even still be riding a bus, these days? You always told me about how you wanted to buy me a pickup truck with automatic gear-shifting once you had the money. I wonder what you’re doing, if you’re still doing freelance film editing, or if you ever got that producing gig at that local cable channel. That’s one of the things that bother me the most, not knowing what’s going on in your life. Not that I should care anymore, I suppose.

Believe it or not, I finally got a regular job. I finally put my Chemical Engineering degree to some use, sort of. I was hired to work on the supply chain of a big multinational company that manufactures such life-essentials as potato chips, paper towels, and deodorants. My position requires that I travel around a lot- to meet customers, to discuss their orders, to inspect the workings of factories and to attend seminars as such. I’ve been to Thailand, India, and Singapore, and that was just this year. I have eaten at the McDonald’s franchises of seven-plus nations. I’ve seen that Taj Mahal (It’s not so great.)

It’s never quite real to me, all this going to foreign lands to meet with various important people to discuss armpit roll-ons. I hope my immediate superior never learns how truly detached I am from what I’m doing. She sees each inflated order as a challenge, each tiny loss of market share as a personal affront. I can’t say I feel the same. You know what I do like about my job? The airports, and the plane rides. It’s nice to buy magazines or books you wouldn’t normally buy, just because you see them on the shelf of an airport newsstand, while you’re waiting. And it’s also nice to be a passenger again once in a while, to let somebody else worry about how to steer, how to get me where I’m going.

It was on a trip to Singapore that I picked up this issue of Discover magazine, and read about Martin Rees, Britain’s Astronomer Royal. It seems that- based on the idea that an array of separate big bands erupted from a primordial dense-matter state- Rees proposes that our universe is but a small, isolated corner of what he terms that multiverse: an infinite variety of universes, each with its own distinctive characteristics. “For example,” the article said, “one universe might feature six dimensions, another universe could have ultraweak gravity.”

If there is an infinity of universes, I thought, leaning back in my padded airline seat, then there might be an infinite number of worlds that are just like ours, save for some detail niggling or important, like a lost president or a different-colored sky. I closed my eyes. Anything one could imagine might be possible. I thought about you. Given an infinity of earths, all of the daydreams I ever made up about us are true, somewhere.

I thought of our time together, of how brief and bittersweet it was. I didn’t tell you something important, then. I guess it’s too late now, but it’s something that occurred to me only after we parted ways. I thought- when I was with you, I was content to just sit back and enjoy the ride, as it were, because the ride was so pleasant. And maybe that was the problem. Neither of us ever learned how to drive, if you’ll forgive the analogy. And I’m not even sure if we got on the right bus, if we were headed the right way. We were happy enough to be travelling together- to be passengers-and we never figured out who was driving.

But what does it matter? Maybe that’s all we’re meant to do, enjoy the trip while it lasts. Maybe luck or faith are the only things that keep us from delays, transfers, fatal crashes.

What if, against all the laws of probability, you happened to be on that plane bound for Singapore too? What if you had walked up that aisle, and taken the seat next to mine? What if you had asked me, then and there, what my last and fondest daydream about the two of us was, what fresh possibility I envisioned that day as I sat in the plane and looked at the clouds through a little round-cornered square of glass? This is what I would have told you:

There is an endless road somewhere, and on that road speeds a hand-me-down rattletrap bus on an endless trip, and somewhere near the back of that bus, you and I are snugly squeezed into one of the two-seater benches, with you next to the window and me next to the aisle, holding hands like schoolchildren, talking, occasionally smiling at each other, looking like we will never let go.

Of Feminism and Other Desires

At times Clara would accompany her mother and two or three of her suffragette friends on their visits to factories, where they would stand on soapboxes and make speeches to the women who worked there while the foremen and the bosses, snickering and hostile, observed them from a prudent distance. Despite her tender age and complete ignorance on matters of the world, Clara grasped the absurdity of the situation and wrote in her notebook about the contrast of her mother and her friends, in their fur coats and suede boots, speaking of oppression, equality and rights to a sad, resigned group of hard-working women in denim aprons, their hands red with chilblains. From the factory the ladies would move on to the tearoom on the Plaza de Armas, where they would stop for tea and pastry and discuss the progress of their campaign, not for a moment letting this frivolous distraction divert them from their flaming ideals. At other times her mother would take her to the slums on the outskirts of the city or to the tenements, where they arrived with their car piled high with food and with clothes that Nivea and her friends sewed for the poor. On these occasions too, the child wrote with forminable intuition that charity had no effect on such monumental injustice. 

Out of all the books I have read, this remains one of my most favorite passages. I have always had a soft spot for the bourgeois woman who has her own soft spot for the poor, and do something about it. I guess it's because it reminds me of my own convictions and the way I am. I was born in a relatively well-to-do family, with a slightly conservative mother but utterly liberal father, which is the background of most of Isabel Allende's heroines. 

My lover compares me to Scarlett O'Hara because of the fire of my soul and the drive for perfection that consumes me, and at times even maddens me. With all due respect, and with the love due him, he is wrong. I do not want to be compared to such a Southern belle with no heart for anybody, not even the man who had doted and loved her without so much as appreciation from her. I see myself instead as an Allende heroine--perhaps Clara the Clairvoyant or Alba Trueba, or maybe  Eva Luna of the many stories. I am a rebel, true, but not one without a cause. Why do you think, dearest lover, why do you think I am in law, fighting nail and claw to remain? What do you think I ask the God of this Universe in my heart of hearts? I want the wisdom to pursue true justice. Law is one sure way to the pursuit of this dream. (Of course you're welcome, dear heart, to share the road with me, as we also share the same goal. But that is another story.)

Reference:

Allende, Isabel. The House of the Spirits. Translated from the Spanish by Magda Bogin. New York: Bantam Books, 1982.

Secretary of National Defense vs. Manalo G.R. No. 180906, October 7, 2008

Facts: The brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo, farmers from Bulacan who were suspected of being members of the New People’s Army, were forcibly taken from their home, detained in various locations, and tortured by CAFGU and military units. After several days in captivity, the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo recognized their abductors as members of the armed forces led by General Jovito Palparan. They also learned that they were being held in place for their brother, Bestre, a suspected leader of the communist insurgents. While in captivity, they met other desaperacidos (including the still-missing University of the Philippines students Karen Empeno and Sherlyn Cadapan) who were also suspected of being communist insurgents and members of the NPA. After eighteen months of restrained liberty, torture and other dehumanizing acts, the brothers were able to escape and file a petition for the writ of amparo.

Issue: Whether or not the right to freedom from fear is or can be protected by existing laws.

Held: Yes. The right to the security of person is not merely a textual hook in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. At its core is the immunity of one’s person against government intrusion. The right to security of person is “freedom from fear,” a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity and security.

To whom may the oppressed, the little ones, the desaperacidos, run to, if the Orwellian sword of the State, wielded recklessly by the military or under the guise of police power, is directed against them? The law thus gives the remedy of the writ of amparo, in addition to the rights and liberties already protected by the Bill of Rights. Amparo, literally meaning “to protect,” is borne out of the long history of Latin American and Philippine human rights abuses—often perpetrated by the armed forces against farmers thought to be communist insurgents, anarchists or brigands. The writ serves to both prevent and cure extralegal killings, enforced disappearances, and threats thereof, giving the powerless a powerful remedy to ensure their rights, liberties, and dignity. Amparo, a triumph of natural law that has been embodied in positive law, gives voice to the preys of silent guns and prisoners behind secret walls.

(This digest is not meant for Constitutional law. Rather, this is written in fulfillment of an assignment in Legal Philosophy.) 

Take-Home Exam in Legal Philosophy

ESSAY

Is law necessary for the ordering of society? – “Societies think they operate by something called morality, but they don't. They operate by something called law. x x x The question is not ‘Was it wrong?’ but ‘Was it legal?’ and not by our law, but by the law at the time. x x x Oh yes, the law is narrow.”

The above quotation from the 2008 film The Reader succinctly articulates the notion that society needs the law in order to function effectively. Law is a cultural force, one of many, but stronger than most, and is thus determinative of the shape and social relations in society. Law is also rigid and narrow, and thus sets a definite framework for society. It needs to be such, as it should regulate the other facets of society, so that all may enjoy the blessings of liberty. This materialist view, along with criticisms of this view, will be further discussed in my succeeding answers in this examination for Legal Philosophy.

What is justice – There are as many definitions of justice as there are philosophers. One of the more well-known and well-loved notions of justice is justice as the ultimate manifestation of the divine will and eternal law, as some followers of Sts. Thomas and Augustine would follow, who in turn follow the Greek traditions of Plato and Aristotle, who, in a nutshell, describe justice as the ultimate virtue. I would like to suggest, however, an alternative view of justice in line with my own leanings towards the Left: Justice is a perception of social relations in balance. It is one aspect of a sense of social cohesion or integration.  The radical broadening of perspective which sociological interpretation seeks makes it possible to enrich understandings of the social condition of justice.  The consistent focus of sociological inquiry on the social, the systematic, and the empirical provides the essential dimensions of this enriched understanding.  Sociological inquiry cannot abolish disagreement as to what justice demands in any particular situation.  But it can reveal the meaning of justice claims in a broader perspective by systematically analyzing the empirical conditions that provide postulates underlying these claims. Rejecting the view that any particular natural morality exists, justice eludes a particular definition for the social view of things.

The law as the will of the State – Law is a combination of the rules of behavior (norms), established or sanctioned by state authority, reflecting the will of the ruling class—rules of behavior whose application is assured by the coercive power of the State for the purpose of protecting, strengthening and developing relationships and procedures suitable and beneficial to the ruling class and the status quo.” By [the base of the superstructure] Marx means also what human beings do—that is, he refers to their material activities or ‘production and reproduction.’  But those, like all human activities, are thinking activities, because it is the essence of human beings to think about what they do.  The distinction between base and superstructure is not one between matter and does not think and thinking that is not material. At some time in the history of a State, the practices are put into words, described, codified, and defended—and those . . . form the superstructure.  . . .  The base is what we do; the superstructure is how we talk about it.  . . . It seems eminently plausible that the base determines the superstructure: Our practices determine how we describe and justify them.

Intertwining of Law, Religion and Morality – Law, under the view of the Positivist school of jurisprudence, can only be justified if a contrast can exist between the moral and legal norms. It presupposes that law is moral by nature, and such morality is absolute, so it becomes meaningless to demand that the law ought to be what it already is. In such a case, what is moral is dictated by the will of God as is made known to men through revelation, following the religious view of morality. Alexander of Hales, an intellectual disciple of St. Augustine of Hippo, succinctly articulates: “the eternal law is the seal and the natural moral law is its impression in the rational nature of man, which is in turn an image of God.” This immanent natural law, based on the divine law, can never be destroyed. Good needs to be done: such is the supreme commandment of God. Good is that which corresponds to nature, and what is contrary to it is bad. Good is to be done is the same as the realization of one’s essential nature. Under this view, there is no such thing as a “bad law” or an “unethical law”; positive law needs to be pertaining to reason, and reason is the voice of God within men’s hearts. Good is justice, that which corresponds to essential nature. God is then justice. Men are always in need of a clearly prescribed and adequately sanctioned system of norms, which emanate from an authority within ourselves—the voice of God in our conscience—and thus the object of positive law, combined with moral and the eternal law, is to render the citizen virtuous.

Immanuel Kant, the greatest German philosopher of the eighteenth century, evolved his own theory of law—a development of the natural law theory.  The source of his views concerning law in his doctrine of morality: he asserted that morality is based upon a supreme moral law, which depends neither upon the experience of the practical activity of human beings nor upon historical conditions and social relationships: it is eternal and changeless.  It is neither created nor conditioned by any person or anything.  It exists per se within each individual.  It dictates its commands to the individual unqualifiedly: categorically; wherefore Kant termed these commands of the moral law ‘a categorical imperative.’  Individuals must carry out the moral law without reference to any considerations of advantage, interest, or expediency, and regardless of their own propensities and sympathies.  If one does good to another from pity, love, friendship, or the like, his conduct will not be moral conduct since he is guided by worldly motives and not alone by respect for the moral law.  According to Kant, therefore, human conduct is moral conduct if it conforms to the moral law and is enjoined solely and exclusively by consciousness of moral duty with no other and foreign motives whatsoever.

The norms of morality are thus isolated from the actual life of human society and personality: from human relationships and from all genuine reality, in general—from everything that exists.  The content of Kant’s moral law—expressed in the form of the categorical imperative, is general and formal in character: ‘so act that the rule of your conduct may be the rule of each and every one.’  No man can be considered a means to an end; he is himself an end and must possess an independent value qua individual.  Accordingly the categorical imperative of morality comprises within itself the rule: ‘so act that each man may ever be regarded as an end, not as a means.’  Kant thus linked his doctrine of morality with the idea of the independent value of personality, whose will—within the moral sphere—is completely free and seeks to fulfill the moral law—and is not defined by any external causes or circumstances.  From these propositions of his doctrine of morality, Kant draws his doctrine of law: law has its foundations in morality; the purport of norms of law, as of norms of morality, is that human conduct conform with the moral law; law differs from morality in that morality is concerned with inward human experiences, requiring not only that man fulfill the requirements of the moral law, but also that such fulfillment be motivated solely by respect for the moral law and by no other stimulus whatsoever; whereas law is concerned only with external human conduct, being satisfied by the fact per se of compliance with the moral law, regardless of the motivation inducing such compliance.  The leading principle of law is the freedom of each personality, wherefore—according to Kant—the essence of law is that the freedom of the one be compatible with the freedom of each and every one.

DEFINITION OF TERMS

Physical Law – The common consciousness of the people (the Zeitgeist and Volkgeist) from which law originates may be discovered not by the form of abstract notions, but in the form of a lively intuition about institutions of law in their organic connection.  Savigny stresses that the common consciousness lies in the biological nature of the people.  Hence, Savigny considers the nation as an organism, that is born, grows, wanes, and dies.  The law is an essential characteristic of this organism.  “The law grows together with its waning, and strengthens together with the strengthening of the nation, and in the end dies when the nation loses its very nationhood.” Karl Marx described positive law as “merely the will of [the ruling] class, erected into legislation—a will whose content is defined by the material conditions of the existence of [the ruling] class.”

Natural Law – Classical Natural Law Theory provides the traditional way of viewing the world or reality.  Given the general order of the universe, there exists a natural law which prescribes a set of duties which men ought morally to obey or comply with depending on his status or place in society.  Hence 'duty' is the primary moral concept.  Man's rights are situated within that general order, and are ultimately based on his duties.  For Natural Rights Theory, the primary moral concept is that of 'right'.  Men naturally have rights.  Rights exist in human beings by nature.  Rights thus are primary and duty derivative.  Duties are derived from the existence of these natural rights.  In particular, because all men have rights, each man has the duty to respect the other's rights.

Moral Law – In some definitions, moral law stems from the Law of Moses, or other laws that may stem from the intertwining of morality and religion when it comes to the organization of society and the codification of law. It is also from moral law that the notions of crimes mala in se are derived; moral law dictates that murder, adultery or theft are wrong because they are morally wrong. Likewise, civil laws on inheritance, marriage and divorce may trace their origins in moral law. In an alternative view provided by German philosopher Immanuel Kant, a good will is a will whose decisions are wholly determined by moral demands or as he often refers to this, by the Moral Law. Human beings view this Law as a constraint on their desires, and hence a will in which the Moral Law is decisive is motivated by the thought of duty. A holy or divine will, if it exists, though good, would not be good because it is motivated by thoughts of duty. A holy will would be entirely free from desires that might operate independently of morality. It is the presence of desires that could operate independently of moral demands that makes goodness in human beings a constraint, an essential element of the idea of ‘duty’. So in analyzing unqualified goodness as it occurs in imperfectly rational creatures such as ourselves, we are investigating the idea of being motivated by the thought that we are constrained to act in certain ways that we might not want to, or the thought that we have moral duties.        

     Like natural law, moral law is never written, unless incorporated by the legislation into positive law, or that such natural or moral law is embodied into the common law system of a State.

Divine Law – Divine law is any law, rule, or system that believes that laws are passed down by a divine figure to mankind. It is also called the eternal law or the law of God. The religious view that such divine law is written by God and made known to man through revelation. As such, it is ultimately impossible to comprehend fully what the eternal law is; St. Thomas Aquinas writes that “human law's purpose is the temporal tranquility of the state, a purpose which the law attains by coercively prohibiting external acts to the extent that these evils can disturb the peaceful state of the state.”

Positive Law – Written or common law followed, maintained and developed by a certain State. Following the Augustinian view, a putative positive law is valid when it does not violate, infringe upon, or is contrary to the natural rights of an individual; otherwise it is invalid. Under legal systems that operate with and through a Bill of Rights, such as in the Philippines and the United States, a particular law or statute is construed as unconstitutional or invalid not only because it fails to conform to the valid procedures for the enactment of a statute, which is known as procedural due process, but also because its substantive content precisely violates the rights of individuals as embodied in the Constitution, referred to as substantive due process. However this may be, an alternative school of thought might raise the argument that positive law is not necessarily the child of moral law; as with the Jim Crow laws of the old US South and the Nuremberg laws of Nazi Germany, the laws to which these types of ‘actions from duty’ conform may be morally despicable.

Two trends are discernible in the natural law school.  The first—represented by Locke, Montesquieu, and others—based the theory of natural law on the doctrine of the individual, inherent rights of man and citizen: immutable, inalienable rights given to him by nature, and incapable of being taken from him by the state.  This doctrine of the inalieanable rights of the personality found expression during the French bourgeois revolution (1789) in the famous Declaration of Rights of Man and Citizen; proclaiming man’s rights to freedom, property, and security—and his right to resist oppression—as eternal and inalienable.  This trend in the natural law school demonstrated the bourgeois liberalism which demanded freedom to develop capitalist relationships and private property.  The other trend—of which Rousseau is the most eminent representative—conceived of natural law as a manifestation of the will of the people, of the popular sovereignty.  According to this view, the rights of citizens merge in the general will of the people, and the equality of citizens is the basic content of natural law. From the viewpoint of the materialist doctrine of society, such a theory is utterly arbitrary: champions of the natural law theory were in accord in asserting the existence of some rational, eternal, and unchanging law; but when they were required to define the content of this natural law and to establish precisely what norms are natural norms, each author proceeded in his own fashion, and the result was that nothing in the law appeared changeless.  

The Law and Literature

Because I stubbornly believe that it is not the artist's job to succumb to despair but to find an antidote to the emptiness of existence.  (Quote from Woody Allen's Midnight in Paris)

• Art 37(1), FC.Oedipus Rex, Sophocles. Jocasta, queen of Corinth, unwittingly marries her son Oedipus. (Marami pang pwede sa Oedipus Rex ni Sophocles. That guy is great.) For stories of incest in the Bible, see my notes sa Art 337 ng RPC.
• Art 37(2), FC. The Children of Hurin, JRR Tolkien. The titular characters, Turin and his sister Nienor, lived under a vengeful god's curse. Yada yada yada, they ended up getting married, and upon discovering their kinship, commit suicide. Bible: depende sa tradition na makakasalamuha natin, Abraham and Sarah are either half-siblings or first-degree cousins. 

• Art 114, RPC. Treason. Just hit the history books. 

• Art 117, RPC. Espionage. Hit the history books!

• Art 122, RPC. Piracy in general and mutiny x x x. Ahoy there, matey! Wala akong maisip na specific example.

• Art 134, RPC. Rebellion/Insurrection. HIT THE HISTORY BOOKS!

• Art 142, RPC. Inciting to Sedition. Kahapon, Ngayon at Bukas, Aurelio Tolentino. Just ask me the plot and what happened when said play was staged. Mas obvious na sagot: Noli at Fili. 

• Art 246, RPC. Parricide. Oedipus Rex, Sophocles. Oedipus unwittingly kills his father, Laius, in what appears to be valid self-defense. So does penalty attach? (It's noteworthy that the original Athenian legend from which Sophocles based his tragedy did not state that there was any self-defense or any other exempting, mitigating, or justifying circumstances whatsoever.) 

• Art 247, RPC. Death Under Special Circumstances. "A Gentleman's Agreement," isang Filipino short story na medyo contemporary lang, but for the life of me hindi ko na maalala yung author. Story goes like this: Husband kills unfaithful Wife thru poison then hires wife's Paramour, an attorney, to represent him in court. Come to think of it, parricide to, hindi to kasama sa Art 247, dahil hindi naman nahuli ni Husband si Paramour at Wife. Totoong halimbawa: Blood Wedding ni Lorca, a brilliant Spanish playwright. Bride marries Groom, then elopes with her Former Lover, has sex with him in the forest, Groom catches them, Groom and Former Lover duel to the death. Actually kung nabuhay si Groom pwede niyang i-avail ang Art 247. So talagang wala akong example ng Art 247.

• Art 248, lahat ng circumstances except (2), (3) at (4). Murder. "The Cask of Amontillado," Edgar Allan Poe. 1. May means to weaken the defense nung pinatay ni Montresor si Fortunato, given that nilasing muna niya ang biktima. 5. Kung di ba naman evident premeditation yung buong plot ay hindi ko na alam kung ano 'yon. 6. Kung hindi ba naman "inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim" maituturing ang paglibing ng buhay kay Fortunato, ewan ko na lang kung ano 'yon.  Interestingly, Montresor tells the tale of how he murdered Fortunato only after fifty years, so nag-prescribe na 'yung crime. Wahaha. 

• Art 253. Giving Assistance to Suicide. Most, if not all, samurai stories have this. 'Eto ang favorite ko. Shogun by James Clavell. Half the samurai mentioned in that story committed hara-kiri, and being samurai, they had seconds who had the honor of chopping off their heads. 

• Art 255. Infanticide.  Marami 'yan, di ko lang maalala at this point. 

• Art 260. Responsibility of Participants to a Duel. The Three Musketeers ni Alexandre Dumas (pere). And basically every other story na may gentlemen who prefer to settle things over sabres or pistols. (May conspiracy din siguro na contemplated sa "One for all, all for one!")

• Art 261. Challenging to a Duel. See immediately preceding entry. 

• Art. 262. Mutilation, first paragraph. Basically what people did, centuries ago, to keep boys' voices abnormally beautiful, ethereal, and high-pitched. On the other side of the globe, basically what courtiers did centuries ago, if they happened to serve in court or in kings' harems. 

• Art 266-A and B. Rape. Naku kalurki. 

• Art 272. Slavery. Genesis. Nung binenta ng mga kapatid ni Jose si Jose sa mga taga-Ehipto. Yada yada yada. Also, Margaret Mitchell's Gone with the Wind. And basically every story that features a negro slave of a Caucasian master. The list goes on. 

• Art 275 (3). Abandoning of Persons in danger x x x; 3. Abandoned Child under Seven Years. The Silmarillion, JRR Tolkien. Somewhere in that Old Testament-esque tale tells the story of the cruel warriors who, after killing King Dior of Doriath, left his two infant sons to starve in the forest.

• Ar 278 (1), (3), at (5). Exploitation of Minors. Sans Famille, Hector Malote. Maybe some of us remember a 90s cartoon called "Remi" whose titular character is sold by his adoptive father to a gypsy vagrant. May nobela yon at kasalanan ng nobelang iyon kung bakit ako naging literature major and hence, a law student. UNBROKEN CHAIN OF EVENTS YAN. Wahaha. Sans Familleliterally means "no family" or "without a family" sa napakahirap bigkasing wikang Pranses.

• Art 311. Theft of Property of the National Library and National Museum. Gusto ko actually 'tong gawin, pero bawal. Wahaha. 

More to come pag sinipag ako. Wahaha. 

A Fairy Tale of Sorts

(This is a project for my Legal Writing class. Our instructions were to pretend to be a lawyer-professor with a column on a newspaper of general circulation, and write about our view on the current impeachment process. For fun, I made my persona a novelist instead of a mere columnist, but God knows how difficult it is to be a practicing lawyer and a novelist at once.) 

Legal Schizophrenia

Professor CMG Lucero teaches Constitutional Law at the University of X. She is a senior partner at the Lucero and Lucero Law Offices. On her spare time, she puts on the finishing touches on her first novel, A Touch of Red on Robes of Black.

As early as January 18, 2012, I have expressed views in my blawg Closet Fantasies my views on the impeachment. In the entry “Legal Schizophrenia,” I made a comparison between my conflicting thoughts on the impeachment: that of a bohemian artist/novelist vis-à-vis a lawyer-professor hoping to impart on the future generation of lawyers a learned veneration for the sacred institution of law. This paper now seeks to elaborate on a doodle I wrote that day. Now, my artist’s intuition tells me that there might be dubious matters unbecoming his position that the Chief Justice hides; and yet as a law professor, presumption of innocence and good faith are among the first things I impart upon my students. Meanwhile, I made a compromise and an analysis of sorts regarding the impeachment before trial commenced. I also classified the two major views regarding the impeachment: the liberal view and the conservative view.[1] (In a way, the discussion regarding the two views has been moot, considering the performance of the prosecution panel. I will elaborate on this later.)

The “Conservative” and the “Liberal” Views

Most of my esteemed colleagues take what I classify as the “conservative” view on the impeachment. I use the term “conservative” here to refer to “doubtful view of the desirability of altering proven institutions and societal values. Respect for authority, custom, and tradition permeate a conservative value system. In particular, changes in the moral ordering of society are seen as very suspicious and probably harmful.[2]” As it is basically a numbers game, some of us believe it has since become a tool by the executive that already has power of a good number of allies in both Houses of Congress, to gain control of the judiciary. Conspiracy theories abound that once the Chief Justice is successfully removed from office via impeachment, the remaining justices would not dare oppose the administration in any of their decisions and resolutions. This would then lead to an abnormal situation wherein the independence and interdependence of the branches would fall under the whims and caprices of the Chief Executive and his allies (or pork barrel-controlled puppets) in Congress.

Generally, I disagree with the conservative view. I did not consider a so-called “attack” on the Chief Justice as an attack on the institution of the judiciary. I did not think—and I still do not think—that trying the Chief Justice would threaten the autonomy of the Judiciary, as the Chief Justice is not in any way the Supreme Court in the manner that Louis XIV is the State. Putting it candidly, Mr. Justice Corona simply cannot claim the divine right of kings (or chief justices) by saying, “La Cour suprême, c’est moi.” He is simply an officer, albeit a high-ranking one, bound just like anyone else under the rule of law. Granting him due process therefore consists in the obligation to have him tried by a competent court (i.e., the Senate sitting as the impeachment court) for violations alleged to him.

This now leads to a discussion of the “liberal” view—that impeaching the Chief Justice, or any member of the Supreme Court for that matter, would threaten the independence of the judiciary and the interdependence of the tripartite system of government. (Note that the word “liberal” does not make any reference whatsoever to the political party bearing the same name; it is used verba legis.)

I use the term “liberal” to describe what may be briefly summed up in the theory of New Liberalism vis-à-vis social justice, where the good of the community is harmonious with the rights of the individual. Connecting this ideology with the impeachment, it is, in a nutshell, the right of the people, through their representatives, to remove from power he whom they no longer trust, without prejudice to the branches of government. Taking from Raul Pangalangan, former Dean of the University of the Philippines College of Law, in his article “Save the Constitution from the Court[3],” the “courts do not have a monopoly to divine its [the Constitution’s] meanings. Holmes recognized that ‘legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as the courts.’” The people themselves also have a say on the Constitution! And if it is their will that the Chief Justice, who has been alleged to have committed a multitude of offenses including a culpable violation of the Constitution and a betrayal of public trust, then their representatives in Congress have the duty to see to it that the will of the sovereign Filipino people is followed. Such an act then does not constitute an offense against the independence of the judiciary or even the interdependence of the branches of government. It is merely a manifestation of the system of checks and balances.

A Constitutional Crisis?

As of the time I’m writing, the Supreme Court has just rendered a decision issuing a temporary restraining order on the subpoena regarding the Chief Justice’s dollar accounts, albeit the same body has deferred to issue another TRO on the entire impeachment proceeding[4]. (This latter act would indeed create a constitutional crisis alive and kicking, as the impeachment court is, though sui generis, a coequal branch of government. To put it candidly, it serves as the sovereign people’s court trying the moral fitness of an impeachable officer, spearheaded by the people’s elected representatives. This is also why apart from “removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines[5],” there is no other sanction for the impeached officer coming from the impeachment court. Regardless of the result of the impeachment, however, the officer may be liable and subject to prosecution, trial and punishment according to law.[6])

Though there is no argument at all about the authority of the Senate sitting as an impeachment court to hear and decide on the case against the Chief Justice, where does the authority of the same body end with regard to existing laws, and especially vis-à-vis the constitutional mandate of the Court to wield the judicial power, defined as “the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government[7]”? With regard to the temporary restraining order issued by the Supreme Court on the subpoena on the Chief Justice’s dollar accounts on a number of banks, would a constitutional crisis ensue if the Senate as an impeachment court still insist on disclosing said documents, particularly as the impeachment court is on equal footing with the other branches of Government? Where would the power of the impeachment court with regard to the controversial documents end and judicial power on determining grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction begin? These are questions I hope will, for the duration of the trial, become moot and academic, as a possible showdown between those two bodies are most definitely detrimental to our legal system and country as a whole.

Unread and Unprepared

“Do not be hasty, that is my motto,” said Treebeard in The Lord of the Rings. I must now express utter dissatisfaction with the conduct of the prosecution panel as a whole. It must be remembered now that there have been allegations that the 188 representatives did not fully read the text of the Articles of Impeachment, but rather signed it hastily. It has now been confirmed by no less than Representative Farinas of the prosecution panel.[8] Was such an act done because in the back of their minds, the representatives knew that the burden of prosecuting lay on a select few of their brethren, and that of judgment on their peers in the Senate[9]?

It is also unbecoming for the prosecution that as early as Day 2 of the trial, the prosecution brought out computer-generated documents without any mark of authentication whatsoever. Needless to say, Presiding Officer Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile refused to acknowledge such.[10] Has the prosecution forgotten a cardinal rule

As a law professor it is utterly irresistible for me to draw an analogy between the prosecution panel and law students. Most, if not all, law students prefer to excuse themselves from class lest they face the terror and embarrassment of coming unprepared. Has the prosecution panel forgotten what is like to be a law student fearing shame and humiliation at the prospect of being caught unprepared? 

And as if it is a joke, the prosecution panel continued to stage a mediocre performance in the afternoon “Coronavela.” Such is seen when Megaworld witness Noli Hernandez’s testimony backfired on the prosecution’s allegation that the Chief Justice received an enormous discount on his penthouse unit in posh The Bellagio Towers in Taguig City. Instead of presenting evidence for an alleged violation against the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act[11] (which was not even alleged in any of the Articles of Impeachment), Hernandez’s testimony provided that the forty percent discount would have been available to anyone and everyone at the time it was given.[12] On February 2, 2012, Lead Prosecutor Representative Tupas responded to Senator Escudero’s query that only 24 out of the 45 assets revealed to the media beforehand would be presented in the prosecution’s evidence. (In the first place, why even disclose the information to the media even before the trial commenced? I would discuss this later.) These are but a few of the bloopers of the trial, notwithstanding Senator Santiago’s sky-high blood pressure level or the occasional jokes brought about when Senator Lapid stood up to ask the prosecution questions on February 12.

Media-Savvy Compensation

Which leads me to my next point. I believe that the prosecution has erred in disclosing to the media the 45 alleged assets and properties of the Chief Justice even before the impeachment commenced. While the layman—and even the bohemian in me—sees this as a probable ploy on part of the prosecution to gain public sympathy, it is nevertheless against a strict interpretation of Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states: “A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party.” (Emphasis provided.)  What is the point of disclosing such to the media? The prosecution knew as much as everybody else that the impeachment trial would be fully covered by the media, and all such allegations would eventually be released.

While the trial itself may not be austerely categorized as “trial by publicity[13],” the prosecution should have, in the

name of professionalism at the very least, refrained from calling a press conference announcing the number of assets the Chief Justice allegedly owns. Absent the showing that such would influence the decisions of the senator-judges, it cannot be held that the Corona impeachment is a trial by publicity. Because even when public opinion holds the Chief Justice in utmost contempt, such cannot directlyinfluence or even coerce the senator judges with regard to their decisions the proceedings. I say directly, because the impeachment, as aforementioned, is a way wherein certain public officers become answerable to the sovereign people through their representatives; the people themselves cannot vote or decide on any impeachment proceeding.

Conclusion: When the Novelist (And Everyone Else) Faces Reality

Among the first things I have learned when I began to study law was to avoid presumption of guilt and bad faith when reasonable doubt and preponderance of evidence. As a humanities enthusiast, where limitless imagination is highly prized and authority is, as a matter of course and principle, critically and creatively questioned, the law requires a strict compliance with the rules, no if’s and but’s. Imagination and speculation may serve a prosecutor or a defense counsel only so much, but it is the establishment of cold, hard facts vis-à-vis positive law that determines the outcome of any judicial proceeding. In the case of Chief Justice Corona, while popular opinion and an unrestrained free spirit tend to believe that there are anomalies, the rule of law, which is supreme over any art, dictates that due process, not unbridled imagination and/or speculation, should prevail. In the immortal words Themistocles to Eurybiades, “Strike, but hear me first![14]” the Chief Justice is entitled to a fair hearing. And this is what he indeed gets, notwithstanding conjectures to the contrary.

A post-script I might also add to this paper. I believe that the Chief Justice, regardless of his guilt or otherwise, is already “damaged goods.” Looking at it from the liberal point of view, the recent move by the defense to have the Supreme Court issue a Temporary Restraining Order on the entire impeachment procedure seems to me a most desperate strategy. Creating a constitutional crisis in order to delay the trial and impede the speedy disposition of justice might be a good tactic. At any rate, if I were the defense, I would have capitalized on the manifest unpreparedness of the prosecution, which seems from many angles wielding fair enough substance but devoid of form. But no amount of technicalities that the defense might provide and use to block evidence, however devoid of form, would save the Chief Justice now. It is my humble opinion that the only honorable recourse for him would be to resign, and spare the nation tedious hours and expenses for Coronavela; and as we do not live in a Confucian society wherein shame is purged by the tonsure or the tantō blade, his mere admission of his sins—whatever they may be—and the return of what is not rightfully his, might be considered enough.

Endnotes

[1] Lucero, Consuelo. Legal Schizophrenia. [Blog]. Retrieved on February 10, 2012 from http://closet-fantasies.blogspot.com/2012/01/legal-schizophrenia.html

[2] Riley, Jim L. Moderate Political Ideologies. Retrieved on February 10, 2012 from http://academic.regis.edu/jriley/libcons.htm

[3] Philippine Daily Inquirer, December 29, 2011

[4] http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/142717/sc-bars-impeachment-court-from-opening-corona-foreign-currency-accounts

[5] Art. XI, Sec. 3(7), 1987 Constitution

[6] Ibid.

[7] Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2), 1987 Constitution

[8] http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?publicationSubCategoryId=63&articleId=775420; http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/141409/prosecution-team-member-admits-corona-impeach-complaint-poorly-crafted

[9] Art. XI, Sec 3(1). The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment. x x x  (6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. x x x

[10] I watched the telecast of GMA News TV on January 17, 2012. The impeachment trial formally commenced a day before, on January 16.

[11] RA No. 3019, as amended. Sec. 3 (b) thereof provides: Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or any other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the Government and any other party, wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law.

[12] http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/business/01/31/12/megaworld-corona-deal-we-uphold-highest-ethical-standard and http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/business/01/31/12/megaworld-corona-deal-we-uphold-highest-ethical-standard. In a nutshell, Hernandez testified that the enormous P10 million discount to the Chief Justice was because of the combination of a discount on punctual payment, a storm that caused water damage to the penthouse unit, and the global financial crisis of 2008 that caused, among others, the prices of real estate property to go down.

[13] In order to warrant a finding of “prejudicial” publicity, there must be an allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the “barrage” of publicity. (Martelino vs. Alejandro, G.R. No. L-30894, March 25, 1970)

[14] Justice Isagani A. Cruz. “Due Process of Law,” Constitutional Law. Quezon City: Central Bookstore. 2007.

Valenzuela vs. Kalayaan

SPOUSES JOSE T. VALENZUELA and GLORIA VALENZUELA, Petitioners,

vs.

KALAYAAN DEVELOPMENT & INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, Respondent.

G.R. No. 163244               June 22, 2009

Ponente: Peralta, J.

Facts: Kalayaan Development & Industrial Corporation discovered that Spouses Jose and Gloria Valenzuela had occupied and built a house on a parcel of land it owned, and demanded that they vacate said property. Upon negotiation, however, petitioners and Kalayaan entered a Contract to Sell wherein the petitioners would purchase 236 square meters of the subject property for P1,416,000 in twelve equal monthly installments. The contract further stated that upon failure to pay any of said installments, petitioners would be liable for liquidated penalty at 3% a month compounded monthly until fully paid. Kalayaan would also execute the deed of absolute sale only upon full payment.

Petitioners were only able to pay monthly installments amounting to a total of P208, 000.00. They then requested Kalayaan to issue a deed of sale for 118 square meters of the lot where their house stood, arguing that since they had paid half the purchase price, or a total of P708,000.00 representing 118 square meters of the property. Kalayaan, on the other hand, sent two demand letters asking petitioners to pay their outstanding obligation including agreed penalties.  

Gloria Valenzuela’s sister, Juliet Giron, assumed the remaining balance for the 118 square meters of the subject property at P10,000.00 per month to Kalayaan, which the latter accepted for and in behalf of Gloria. Thereafter, Kalayaan demanded that petitioners pay their outstanding obligation, but were unheeded. Kalyaan then filed a Complaint fot the Rescission of Contract and Damages against petitioners. The RTC of Caloocan rendered a Decision in favor of Kalayaan, rescinding the contract between the parties and ordering petitioners to vacate the premises.

Petitioners sought recourse from the CA. They aver that the CA failed to see that the original contract between petitioners and Kalayaan was altered, changed, modified and restricted as a consequence of the change in the person of the principal debtor (Sps. Valenzuela to Juliet). When Kalayaan agreed to a monthly amortization of P10,000.00 per month the original contract was changed, and that the same recognized Juliet’s capacity to pay and her designation as the new debtor. Nevertheless, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling.

Issue: If the original contract was novated and the principal obligation to pay for the remaining half of the subject property was transferred from petitioners to Juliet.

Held: No. Novation is never presumed. Novation is the extinguishment of an obligation by the substitution or change of the obligation by a subsequent one which extinguishes or modifies the first, either by changing the object or principal conditions, or by substituting another in place of the debtor, or by subrogating a third person in the rights of the creditor. Parties to a contract must expressly agree that they are abrogating their old contract in favor of a new one. In absence of an express agreement, novation takes place only when the old and new obligations are incompatible on every point.

These are the indispensable requisites of novation:

1) There must be a previous valid obligation;

2) There must be an agreement of the parties concerned to a new contract;

3) There must be the extinguishment of the old contract; and

4) There must be the validity of the new contract.

In the instant case, none of the aforementioned requisites are present, as Kalayaan never agreed to the creation of a new contract between them or Juliet. Kalayaan’s acceptance of the late payments made by Juliet is, at best, an act of tolerance on part of Kalayaan that could not have modified the contract.

The non-fulfillment by petitioners of their obligation to pay, which is a suspensive condition for the obligation of Kalayaan to sell and deliver the title to the property, rendered the Contract to Sell ineffective and without force and effect. The parties stand as if the conditional obligation had never existed; Kalayaan cannot be compelled to transfer ownership of the property to petitioners.