Monday, March 26, 2012

Of Feminism and Other Desires


At times Clara would accompany her mother and two or three of her suffragette friends on their visits to factories, where they would stand on soapboxes and make speeches to the women who worked there while the foremen and the bosses, snickering and hostile, observed them from a prudent distance. Despite her tender age and complete ignorance on matters of the world, Clara grasped the absurdity of the situation and wrote in her notebook about the contrast of her mother and her friends, in their fur coats and suede boots, speaking of oppression, equality and rights to a sad, resigned group of hard-working women in denim aprons, their hands red with chilblains. From the factory the ladies would move on to the tearoom on the Plaza de Armas, where they would stop for tea and pastry and discuss the progress of their campaign, not for a moment letting this frivolous distraction divert them from their flaming ideals. At other times her mother would take her to the slums on the outskirts of the city or to the tenements, where they arrived with their car piled high with food and with clothes that Nivea and her friends sewed for the poor. On these occasions too, the child wrote with forminable intuition that charity had no effect on such monumental injustice. 

Out of all the books I have read, this remains one of my most favorite passages. I have always had a soft spot for the bourgeois woman who has her own soft spot for the poor, and do something about it. I guess it's because it reminds me of my own convictions and the way I am. I was born in a relatively well-to-do family, with a slightly conservative mother but utterly liberal father, which is the background of most of Isabel Allende's heroines. 

My lover compares me to Scarlett O'Hara because of the fire of my soul and the drive for perfection that consumes me, and at times even maddens me. With all due respect, and with the love due him, he is wrong. I do not want to be compared to such a Southern belle with no heart for anybody, not even the man who had doted and loved her without so much as appreciation from her. I see myself instead as an Allende heroine--perhaps Clara the Clairvoyant or Alba Trueba, or maybe  Eva Luna of the many stories. I am a rebel, true, but not one without a cause. Why do you think, dearest lover, why do you think I am in law, fighting nail and claw to remain? What do you think I ask the God of this Universe in my heart of hearts? I want the wisdom to pursue true justice. Law is one sure way to the pursuit of this dream. (Of course you're welcome, dear heart, to share the road with me, as we also share the same goal. But that is another story.)

Reference:

Allende, Isabel. The House of the Spirits. Translated from the Spanish by Magda Bogin. New York: Bantam Books, 1982.

Thursday, March 22, 2012

Secretary of National Defense vs. Manalo G.R. No. 180906, October 7, 2008


Facts: The brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo, farmers from Bulacan who were suspected of being members of the New People’s Army, were forcibly taken from their home, detained in various locations, and tortured by CAFGU and military units. After several days in captivity, the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo recognized their abductors as members of the armed forces led by General Jovito Palparan. They also learned that they were being held in place for their brother, Bestre, a suspected leader of the communist insurgents. While in captivity, they met other desaperacidos (including the still-missing University of the Philippines students Karen Empeno and Sherlyn Cadapan) who were also suspected of being communist insurgents and members of the NPA. After eighteen months of restrained liberty, torture and other dehumanizing acts, the brothers were able to escape and file a petition for the writ of amparo.

Issue: Whether or not the right to freedom from fear is or can be protected by existing laws.

Held: Yes. The right to the security of person is not merely a textual hook in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. At its core is the immunity of one’s person against government intrusion. The right to security of person is “freedom from fear,” a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity and security.
To whom may the oppressed, the little ones, the desaperacidos, run to, if the Orwellian sword of the State, wielded recklessly by the military or under the guise of police power, is directed against them? The law thus gives the remedy of the writ of amparo, in addition to the rights and liberties already protected by the Bill of Rights. Amparo, literally meaning “to protect,” is borne out of the long history of Latin American and Philippine human rights abuses—often perpetrated by the armed forces against farmers thought to be communist insurgents, anarchists or brigands. The writ serves to both prevent and cure extralegal killings, enforced disappearances, and threats thereof, giving the powerless a powerful remedy to ensure their rights, liberties, and dignity. Amparo, a triumph of natural law that has been embodied in positive law, gives voice to the preys of silent guns and prisoners behind secret walls.

(This digest is not meant for Constitutional law. Rather, this is written in fulfillment of an assignment in Legal Philosophy.) 

Take-Home Exam in Legal Philosophy


ESSAY

Is law necessary for the ordering of society? – “Societies think they operate by something called morality, but they don't. They operate by something called law. x x x The question is not ‘Was it wrong?’ but ‘Was it legal?’ and not by our law, but by the law at the time. x x x Oh yes, the law is narrow.”
The above quotation from the 2008 film The Reader succinctly articulates the notion that society needs the law in order to function effectively. Law is a cultural force, one of many, but stronger than most, and is thus determinative of the shape and social relations in society. Law is also rigid and narrow, and thus sets a definite framework for society. It needs to be such, as it should regulate the other facets of society, so that all may enjoy the blessings of liberty. This materialist view, along with criticisms of this view, will be further discussed in my succeeding answers in this examination for Legal Philosophy.

What is justice – There are as many definitions of justice as there are philosophers. One of the more well-known and well-loved notions of justice is justice as the ultimate manifestation of the divine will and eternal law, as some followers of Sts. Thomas and Augustine would follow, who in turn follow the Greek traditions of Plato and Aristotle, who, in a nutshell, describe justice as the ultimate virtue. I would like to suggest, however, an alternative view of justice in line with my own leanings towards the Left: Justice is a perception of social relations in balance. It is one aspect of a sense of social cohesion or integration.  The radical broadening of perspective which sociological interpretation seeks makes it possible to enrich understandings of the social condition of justice.  The consistent focus of sociological inquiry on the social, the systematic, and the empirical provides the essential dimensions of this enriched understanding.  Sociological inquiry cannot abolish disagreement as to what justice demands in any particular situation.  But it can reveal the meaning of justice claims in a broader perspective by systematically analyzing the empirical conditions that provide postulates underlying these claims. Rejecting the view that any particular natural morality exists, justice eludes a particular definition for the social view of things.

The law as the will of the State – Law is a combination of the rules of behavior (norms), established or sanctioned by state authority, reflecting the will of the ruling class—rules of behavior whose application is assured by the coercive power of the State for the purpose of protecting, strengthening and developing relationships and procedures suitable and beneficial to the ruling class and the status quo.” By [the base of the superstructure] Marx means also what human beings do—that is, he refers to their material activities or ‘production and reproduction.’  But those, like all human activities, are thinking activities, because it is the essence of human beings to think about what they do.  The distinction between base and superstructure is not one between matter and does not think and thinking that is not material. At some time in the history of a State, the practices are put into words, described, codified, and defended—and those . . . form the superstructure.  . . .  The base is what we do; the superstructure is how we talk about it.  . . . It seems eminently plausible that the base determines the superstructure: Our practices determine how we describe and justify them.

Intertwining of Law, Religion and Morality – Law, under the view of the Positivist school of jurisprudence, can only be justified if a contrast can exist between the moral and legal norms. It presupposes that law is moral by nature, and such morality is absolute, so it becomes meaningless to demand that the law ought to be what it already is. In such a case, what is moral is dictated by the will of God as is made known to men through revelation, following the religious view of morality. Alexander of Hales, an intellectual disciple of St. Augustine of Hippo, succinctly articulates: “the eternal law is the seal and the natural moral law is its impression in the rational nature of man, which is in turn an image of God.” This immanent natural law, based on the divine law, can never be destroyed. Good needs to be done: such is the supreme commandment of God. Good is that which corresponds to nature, and what is contrary to it is bad. Good is to be done is the same as the realization of one’s essential nature. Under this view, there is no such thing as a “bad law” or an “unethical law”; positive law needs to be pertaining to reason, and reason is the voice of God within men’s hearts. Good is justice, that which corresponds to essential nature. God is then justice. Men are always in need of a clearly prescribed and adequately sanctioned system of norms, which emanate from an authority within ourselves—the voice of God in our conscience—and thus the object of positive law, combined with moral and the eternal law, is to render the citizen virtuous.
Immanuel Kant, the greatest German philosopher of the eighteenth century, evolved his own theory of law—a development of the natural law theory.  The source of his views concerning law in his doctrine of morality: he asserted that morality is based upon a supreme moral law, which depends neither upon the experience of the practical activity of human beings nor upon historical conditions and social relationships: it is eternal and changeless.  It is neither created nor conditioned by any person or anything.  It exists per se within each individual.  It dictates its commands to the individual unqualifiedly: categorically; wherefore Kant termed these commands of the moral law ‘a categorical imperative.’  Individuals must carry out the moral law without reference to any considerations of advantage, interest, or expediency, and regardless of their own propensities and sympathies.  If one does good to another from pity, love, friendship, or the like, his conduct will not be moral conduct since he is guided by worldly motives and not alone by respect for the moral law.  According to Kant, therefore, human conduct is moral conduct if it conforms to the moral law and is enjoined solely and exclusively by consciousness of moral duty with no other and foreign motives whatsoever.
The norms of morality are thus isolated from the actual life of human society and personality: from human relationships and from all genuine reality, in general—from everything that exists.  The content of Kant’s moral law—expressed in the form of the categorical imperative, is general and formal in character: ‘so act that the rule of your conduct may be the rule of each and every one.’  No man can be considered a means to an end; he is himself an end and must possess an independent value qua individual.  Accordingly the categorical imperative of morality comprises within itself the rule: ‘so act that each man may ever be regarded as an end, not as a means.’  Kant thus linked his doctrine of morality with the idea of the independent value of personality, whose will—within the moral sphere—is completely free and seeks to fulfill the moral law—and is not defined by any external causes or circumstances.  From these propositions of his doctrine of morality, Kant draws his doctrine of law: law has its foundations in morality; the purport of norms of law, as of norms of morality, is that human conduct conform with the moral law; law differs from morality in that morality is concerned with inward human experiences, requiring not only that man fulfill the requirements of the moral law, but also that such fulfillment be motivated solely by respect for the moral law and by no other stimulus whatsoever; whereas law is concerned only with external human conduct, being satisfied by the fact per se of compliance with the moral law, regardless of the motivation inducing such compliance.  The leading principle of law is the freedom of each personality, wherefore—according to Kant—the essence of law is that the freedom of the one be compatible with the freedom of each and every one.

DEFINITION OF TERMS

Physical Law – The common consciousness of the people (the Zeitgeist and Volkgeist) from which law originates may be discovered not by the form of abstract notions, but in the form of a lively intuition about institutions of law in their organic connection.  Savigny stresses that the common consciousness lies in the biological nature of the people.  Hence, Savigny considers the nation as an organism, that is born, grows, wanes, and dies.  The law is an essential characteristic of this organism.  “The law grows together with its waning, and strengthens together with the strengthening of the nation, and in the end dies when the nation loses its very nationhood.” Karl Marx described positive law as “merely the will of [the ruling] class, erected into legislation—a will whose content is defined by the material conditions of the existence of [the ruling] class.”

Natural Law – Classical Natural Law Theory provides the traditional way of viewing the world or reality.  Given the general order of the universe, there exists a natural law which prescribes a set of duties which men ought morally to obey or comply with depending on his status or place in society.  Hence 'duty' is the primary moral concept.  Man's rights are situated within that general order, and are ultimately based on his duties.  For Natural Rights Theory, the primary moral concept is that of 'right'.  Men naturally have rights.  Rights exist in human beings by nature.  Rights thus are primary and duty derivative.  Duties are derived from the existence of these natural rights.  In particular, because all men have rights, each man has the duty to respect the other's rights.

Moral Law – In some definitions, moral law stems from the Law of Moses, or other laws that may stem from the intertwining of morality and religion when it comes to the organization of society and the codification of law. It is also from moral law that the notions of crimes mala in se are derived; moral law dictates that murder, adultery or theft are wrong because they are morally wrong. Likewise, civil laws on inheritance, marriage and divorce may trace their origins in moral law. In an alternative view provided by German philosopher Immanuel Kant, a good will is a will whose decisions are wholly determined by moral demands or as he often refers to this, by the Moral Law. Human beings view this Law as a constraint on their desires, and hence a will in which the Moral Law is decisive is motivated by the thought of duty. A holy or divine will, if it exists, though good, would not be good because it is motivated by thoughts of duty. A holy will would be entirely free from desires that might operate independently of morality. It is the presence of desires that could operate independently of moral demands that makes goodness in human beings a constraint, an essential element of the idea of ‘duty’. So in analyzing unqualified goodness as it occurs in imperfectly rational creatures such as ourselves, we are investigating the idea of being motivated by the thought that we are constrained to act in certain ways that we might not want to, or the thought that we have moral duties.        
     Like natural law, moral law is never written, unless incorporated by the legislation into positive law, or that such natural or moral law is embodied into the common law system of a State.

Divine Law – Divine law is any law, rule, or system that believes that laws are passed down by a divine figure to mankind. It is also called the eternal law or the law of God. The religious view that such divine law is written by God and made known to man through revelation. As such, it is ultimately impossible to comprehend fully what the eternal law is; St. Thomas Aquinas writes that “human law's purpose is the temporal tranquility of the state, a purpose which the law attains by coercively prohibiting external acts to the extent that these evils can disturb the peaceful state of the state.”

Positive Law – Written or common law followed, maintained and developed by a certain State. Following the Augustinian view, a putative positive law is valid when it does not violate, infringe upon, or is contrary to the natural rights of an individual; otherwise it is invalid. Under legal systems that operate with and through a Bill of Rights, such as in the Philippines and the United States, a particular law or statute is construed as unconstitutional or invalid not only because it fails to conform to the valid procedures for the enactment of a statute, which is known as procedural due process, but also because its substantive content precisely violates the rights of individuals as embodied in the Constitution, referred to as substantive due process. However this may be, an alternative school of thought might raise the argument that positive law is not necessarily the child of moral law; as with the Jim Crow laws of the old US South and the Nuremberg laws of Nazi Germany, the laws to which these types of ‘actions from duty’ conform may be morally despicable.
Two trends are discernible in the natural law school.  The first—represented by Locke, Montesquieu, and others—based the theory of natural law on the doctrine of the individual, inherent rights of man and citizen: immutable, inalienable rights given to him by nature, and incapable of being taken from him by the state.  This doctrine of the inalieanable rights of the personality found expression during the French bourgeois revolution (1789) in the famous Declaration of Rights of Man and Citizen; proclaiming man’s rights to freedom, property, and security—and his right to resist oppression—as eternal and inalienable.  This trend in the natural law school demonstrated the bourgeois liberalism which demanded freedom to develop capitalist relationships and private property.  The other trend—of which Rousseau is the most eminent representative—conceived of natural law as a manifestation of the will of the people, of the popular sovereignty.  According to this view, the rights of citizens merge in the general will of the people, and the equality of citizens is the basic content of natural law. From the viewpoint of the materialist doctrine of society, such a theory is utterly arbitrary: champions of the natural law theory were in accord in asserting the existence of some rational, eternal, and unchanging law; but when they were required to define the content of this natural law and to establish precisely what norms are natural norms, each author proceeded in his own fashion, and the result was that nothing in the law appeared changeless.