People vs. Burgos (G.R. No. L-68955 September 4, 1986)

G.R. No. L-68955 September 4, 1986

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 
vs.
RUBEN BURGOS y TITO, defendant-appellant.

Facts: Defendant is charged with illegal possession of firearm in furtherance of subversion (tasks such as recruiting members to the NPA and collection of contributions from its members) and found guilty by the RTC of Digos, Davao del Sur. From the information filed by the police authorities upon the information given by Masamlok, allegedly a man defendant tried to recruit into the NPA, the police authorities arrest defendant and had his house searched. Subsequently, certain NPA-related documents and a firearm, allegedly issued and used by one Alias Cmdr. Pol of the NPA, are confiscated. Defendant denies being involved in any subversive activities and claims that he has been tortured in order to accept ownership of subject firearm and that his alleged extrajudicial statements have been made only under fear, threat and intimidation on his person and his family. He avers that his arrest is unlawful as it is done without valid warrant, that the trial court erred in holding the search warrant in his house for the firearm lawful, and that the trial court erred in holding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of PD 9 in relation to GOs 6and 7.

Issue: If defendant’s arrest, the search of his home, and the subsequent confiscation of a firearm and several NPA-related documents are lawful.

Held: Records disclose that when the police went to defendant’s house to arrest him upon the information given by Masamlok, they had neither search nor arrest warrant with them—in wanton violation of ArtIV, Sec 3 (now Art III, sec 2). As the Court held in Villanueva vs Querubin, the state, however powerful, doesn’t have access to a man’s home, his haven of refuge where his individuality can assert itself in his choice of welcome and in the kind of objects he wants around him. In the traditional formulation, a man’s house, however humble, is his castle, and thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by the government.

The trial court justified the warrantless arrest under Rule 113 Sec 6 of the RoC:

a)          When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to commit an offense in his presence;

b)          When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed it;

c)          When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another

and the confiscation of the firearm under Rule 126, Sec 12:

A person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense.

However, the trial court has erred in its conclusion that said warrantless arrest is under the ambit of aforementioned RoC. At the time of defendant’s arrest, he wasn’t in actual possession of any firearm or subversive document, and was not committing any “subversive” act—he was plowing his field. It is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime in a warrantless arrest. An essential precondition is that a crime must have beenin fact or actually have been committed first; it isn’t enough to suspect a crime may have been committed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator. The Court also finds no compelling reason for the haste with which the arresting officers sought to arrest the accused. We fail to see why they failed to first go through the process of obtaining a warrant of arrest, if indeed they had reasonable ground to believe that the accused had truly committed a crime. There is no showing that there was a real apprehension that the accused was on the verge of flight or escape. Likewise, there is no showing that the whereabouts of the accused were unknown.

In proving the ownership of the questioned firearm and alleged subversive documents, assuming they were really illegal, the defendant was never informed of his constitutional rights at the time of his arrest; thus the admissions obtained are in violation of the constitutional right against self-incrimination under Sec 20 Art IV (now Sec 12, Art III) and thus inadmissible as evidence.

Furthermore, the defendant was not accorded his constitutional right to be assisted by counsel during the custodial interrogation. His extra-judicial confession, the firearm, and the alleged subversive documents are all inadmissible as evidence. In light of the aforementioned, defendant is acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt of the crime with which he has been charged. Subject firearm and alleged subversive documents have been disposed of in accordance with law.

The Court also maintains that violations of human rights do not help in overcoming a rebellion. Reiterating Morales vs Enrile, “while the government should continue to repel the communists, the subversives, the rebels, and the lawless with the means at its command, it should always be remembered that whatever action is taken must always be within the framework of our Constitution and our laws.”

Stonehill vs. Diokno

G.R. No. L-19550             June 19, 1967

HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL BECK, petitioners, 
vs.
HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in his capacity as Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST. FISCAL MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE HERMOGENES CALUAG, Court of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of Quezon City, respondents.

Facts: Petitioners, who have prior deportation cases pending, and the corporation they form were alleged to committed "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code,” to which they were served 4 search warrants, directing any peace officer to search petitioners’  persons and/or premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences for: “books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).”

The items allegedly illegally obtained can be classified into two groups: (1) those found and seized in the offices of aforementioned corporations, and (2) those found in petitioners’ residences.

Petitioners aver that the warrant is illegal for, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law x x x.

Respondent-prosecutors invoke the Moncado vs People’s Court ruling: even if the searches and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners herein.

Issue: Validity of the search warrants.

Held: The SC ruled in favor of Stonehill et. al., reversing the Moncado doctrine. Though Stonehill et. al. are not the proper parties to assail the validity of the search warrant issued against their corporation and thus they have no cause of action (only the officers or board members of said corporation may assail said warrant, and that corporations have personalities distinct from petitioners’ personalities), the 3 warrants issued to search petitioners’ residences are hereby declared void. Thus, the searches and seizures made therein are made illegal.

The constitution protects the people’s right against unreasonable search and seizure. It provides:

 (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and

 (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. 


In the case at bar, none of these are met.

 The warrant was issued from mere allegation that petitioners  committed a “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code.” As no specific violation has been alleged, it was impossible for the judges who issued said warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed or committed violations of the law. In other words, it would be a legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code,” — as alleged in the aforementioned applications — without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or codes. General warrants are also to be eliminated, as the legality or illegality of petitioners’ transactions is immaterial to the invalidity of the general warrant that sought these effects to be searched and seized: “Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss statements.”

The Court also holds that the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures is, in the language of the Federal Supreme Court:  x x x  If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his rights to be secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land. 

People vs Marti

G.R. No. 81561 January 18, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
vs.
ANDRE MARTI, accused-appellant.

Facts: The proprietors of Manila Packing and Export Forwarders, following standard operating procedure, opened four gift wrapped boxes from which emerged a peculiar odor. They reported this to the NBI on the same day, and in the presence of said agents, opened the boxes which contained marijuana. The NBI filed an information against appellant for violation of RA 6425, Dangerous Drugs Act, but appellant contended that the evidence had been obtained in violation of consti rights against unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of communication.

Issue: May an act of a private individual without the intervention and participation of the State, and allegedly in violation of appellant’s constitutional rights, be invoked against the State?

Held: No. It was the proprietor of the forwarding agency who made search/inspection of the packages, not the NBI, as appellant would have the Court believe. Said inspection was reasonable and a standard operating procedure on the part of the proprietor as a precautionary measure before delivery of packages to the Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Posts. Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search the proprietor effected into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search.

Outlawed is any unwarranted intrusion by the government, which is called upon to refrain from any invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life. However, in the absence of governmental interference, the liberties granted by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State. As held in Bernas vs. US, the Fourth Amendment and the law applying to it do not require exclusion of evidence obtained through a search by a private citizen; rather the amendment only proscribes government action. To agree with appellant that an act of a private individual in violation of the Bill of Rights should also be construed as an act of the State would result in serious legal complications and an absurd interpretation of the constitution.

The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.

People vs Cayat

G.R. No. L-45987             May 5, 1939

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 
vs.
CAYAT, defendant-appellant

Facts:

Cayat was a native from Baguio, Benguet, Mt. Province who was found guilty of violation of Sections 2 and 3 of Act 1639: It shall be unlawful for any native of the Philippine Islands who is a member of a non-Christian tribe within the meaning of the Act Numbered Thirteen hundred and ninety-seven, to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of this Act, except as provided in section one hereof; and it shall be the duty of any police officer or other duly authorized agent of the Insular or any provincial, municipal or township government to seize and forthwith destroy any such liquors found unlawfully in the possession of any member of a non-Christian tribe.

SEC. 3. Any person violating the provisions of section one or section two of this Act shall, upon conviction thereof, be punishable for each offense by a fine of not exceeding two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, in the discretion of the court.

Issues:

1.      If  said law is discriminatory and denies EP of laws;

2.      If said law is an improper exercise of the police power of the state.

Held:

1.     Said statute does not deny EP of laws; the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. And the classification, to be reasonable:

a.      must rest on substantial distinctions;

b.      must be germane to the purposes of the law;

c.       must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

d.      must apply equally to all members of the same class.

Act 1639 meets all such requirements. The classification rests on real and substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon "accident of birth or parentage” but upon the degree of civilization and culture. "The term 'non-Christian tribes' refers, not to religious belief, but to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities.

When the public safety or the public morals require the discontinuance of a certain practice by certain class of persons, the hand of the Legislature cannot be stayed from providing for its discontinuance by any incidental inconvenience which some members of the class may suffer. The private interests of such members must yield to the paramount interests of the nation. The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as "an inferior or less capable race." On the contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the public policy towards them rest upon a recognition of their inherent right to equality in that enjoyment of those privileges now enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as there can be no true equality before the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in education, the government has endeavored, by appropriate measures, to raise their culture and civilization and secure for them the benefits of their progress, with the ultimate end in view of placing them with their Christian brothers on the basis of true equality.

The prohibition is germane to the purposes of the law. It is designed to insure peace and order in and among the non- Christian tribes has often resulted in lawlessness and crime thereby hampering the efforts of the government to raise their standards of life and civilization. This law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of the enactment. It is intended to apply for all times as long as those conditions exists. The Act applies equally to all members of the class. That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number of non- Christians by reason of their degree of culture is not an argument against the equality of its operation nor affect the reasonableness of the classification thus established.

2.      Said statute is not an improper exercise of the PPS. Any measure intended to promote the health, peace, morals, education, and good order of the people or to increase the industries of the state, develop its resources and add to its wealth and prosperity is legitimate exercise of police power, unless shown to be whimsical or capricious as to unduly interfere with the rights of an individual. Act 1639 is designed to promote peace and order to non-Christian tribes and to eventually hasten their equalization and unification with the rest of their Christian brothers.

Ormoc Sugar Company Inc. vs Treasurer of Ormoc City

G.R. No. L-23794     February 17, 1968
ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. THE TREASURER OF ORMOC CITY, THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF ORMOC CITY, HON. ESTEBAN C. CONEJOS as Mayor of Ormoc City and ORMOC CITY, Defendants-Appellees.

Facts:

The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed a municipal tax ordinance imposing on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company Inc. one percent per export sale to the US and other foreign countries. Said company filed before the CFI of Leyte a complaint against the City of Ormoc, its Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor, alleging sasid ordinance is violative of the equal protection clause and the rule of uniformity of taxation, among other things.  Ormoc Sugar Company Inc. was the only sugar central in Ormoc City at the time.

Issue:

WON the constitutional limits on the power of taxation, specifically the EPC and uniformity of taxation, were infringed.

Held:

Yes. Though Ormoc Sugar Company Inc. is the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc at the time, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. Said ordinance shoouldn’t be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, for coverage of the tax.

EPC applies only to persons or things identically situated and doesn’t bar a reasonable classificationof the subject of legislation. A classification is reasonable where: 1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class.

Republic vs Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (GR No. L-21749, September 29, 1967)

Facts: A barge being towed by tugboats "Bangus" and "Barbero" all owned by Luzon Stevedoring Corp. rammed one of the wooden piles of the Nagtahan Bailey Bridge due to the swollen current of the Pasig after heavy rains days before. The Republic sued Luzon Stevedoring for actual and consequential damages. Luzon Stevedoring claimed it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees; that the damages to the bridge were caused by force majeure; that plaintiff has no capacity to sue; and that the Nagtahan bailey bridge is an obstruction to navigation.


Issue: Whether or not the collision of appellant's barge with the supports or piers of the Nagtahan bridge was in law caused by fortuitous event or force majeure.

Held: There is a presumption of negligence on part of the employees of Luzon Stevedoring, as the Nagtahan Bridge is stationary. For caso fortuito or force majeure (which in law are identical in so far as they exempt an obligor from liability) by definition, are extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable, "events that could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable" (Art. 1174, Civ. Code of the Philippines). It is, therefore, not enough that the event should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly believed, but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. The mere difficulty to foresee the happening is not impossibility to foresee the same. Luzon Stevedoring knew the perils posed by the swollen stream and its swift current, and voluntarily entered into a situation involving obvious danger; it therefore assured the risk, and can not shed responsibility merely because the precautions it adopted turned out to be insufficient. It is thus liable for damages. 

People vs. Bati (G.R. No. 87429, August 27, 1990)

Facts: By the word of their civilian informer, Patrolmen Jose Luciano, Angelito Caraan, Nelson Dimatulac and Democrito Cuenca immediately proceeded to the vicinity an alleged buy-and-sell of marijuana was taking place. They saw Marquez giving something to Bati, who, thereafter, handed a wrapped object, which turned out to be marijuana worth P190, to Marquez who then inserted the object inside the front of his pants in front of his abdomen while Bati, on his part, placed the thing given to him inside his pocket. Marquez was arrested on the spot. Both Bati and Marquez were brought to the Police station where they admitted they were in the buying and selling of the confiscated marijuana.

Issue: Appellant contends that the arrest was not valid as the requirements for a warrantless arrest were not complied with.

Held: This contention is without merit.

Section 5 Rule 113 of the Rules in Criminal Procedure clearly provides:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant, when lawful. — A peace officer or private person may, without warrant, arrest a person:

(a)            When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b)            When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it x x x

It is the considered view of the Court that there was no need for Luciano and Caraan to be armed with a warrant of arrest when they arrested Marquez and the accused since they had personal knowledge of the actual commission of the crime viz: They were eyewitnesses to the illegal exchange of marijuana and P190.00 between Marquez and accused who were caught in flagrante delicto. The facts and circumstances attendant precisely fall under Sec. 5, (a), Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. The subsequent arrest of Marquez and accused were made under the principle of "hot pursuit". The recovery of the marijuana from Marquez and the P190.00 from accused by the said police officers were not violative of their constitutional rights since Marquez and the accused voluntarily surrendered them to the police officers. But even for the sake of argument that the recovery of the marijuana and peso bills were against the consent of Marquez and accused, still, the search on their persons was incidental to their valid warrantless arrest. For, the rule that searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule. There are at least three exceptions: (1) search incidental to an arrest, (2) search of a moving vehicle and (3) seizure of evidence in plain view. In the case at bar, the searches made on Marquez and accused were incidental to their valid arrest.

Having caught the appellant in flagrante as a result of the buy-bust operation, the policemen were not only authorized but were also under obligation to apprehend the drug pusher even without a warrant of arrest And since appellant's arrest was lawful, it follows that the search made incidental to the arrest was also valid.

Supreme Court Poetry: The law is severe because those who are caught in the strangle hold of prohibited drugs not only slide into the ranks of the living dead, what is worse, they become a grave menace to the safety of the law-abiding members of society. 

People vs. Lol-lo and Saraw (G.R. No. 17958, February 27, 1922)

Facts: Pinirata nina Lol-lo, Saraw, at 22 iba pa na nakasakay sa anim na vinta ang dalawang barko kung saan nakasakay ang 11 Olandes sa karagatan ng Dutch East Indies. (Kalurky, hindi pa sila Indonesia! Ancient case is ancient!) Nagpanggap silang humihingi ng pagkain, at nang ma-board nila ang dalawang Olandes na barko, ninakawan, nambugbog, at nang-rape with methods "too horrible to be described." (HAHAHAHA na-offend ang quasi-Victorian sensibilities si Justice Malcolm!) Matapos nito'y iniwanan ng mga kups ang mga Olandes sa mga naturang barko na pinuncture na rin nila, but taking the two poor women with them. 

Pero animo'y hinabol rin sila ng hustisya, dahil nailigtas ang mga Olandes at eventually ay na-charge sina Lol-lo at Saraw sa CFI ng Sulu. (Hindi pa Sharia court. Char!) 

Issue: Jurisdiction ng CFI ng Sulu sa isang krimeng hindi naganap sa Pinas. 

Held: CFI of Sulu has jurisdiction. "'Pirates are in law hostes humani generis. Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind. It may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits. As it is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes.' (U.S. vs. Furlong [1820], 5 Wheat., 184.)

All of the elements of the crime of piracy are present. Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi, and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility." (Emphasis akin. Obviously. Hindi iyo. CHAR!)

Ibig sabihin, kahit nasaan ka sa mundo, CHAR!!! pag nag-feeling Bluebeard or Captain Jack Sparrow ka, or nakipag-conspire ka with Somali pirates, pwede kang kasuhan sa mga korte sa Pinas, or basically any nation na may laws sa piracy. 


Napaka-poetic na whatnot ng Korte: The days when pirates roamed the seas, when picturesque buccaneers like Captain Avery and Captain Kidd and Bartholomew Roberts gripped the imagination, when grostesque brutes like Blackbeard flourished, seem far away in the pages of history and romance. Nevertheless, the record before us tells a tale of twentieth century piracy in the south seas, but stripped of all touches of chivalry or of generosity, so as to present a horrible case of rapine and near murder.

Oblicon for Dummies, Part 1, is now available for download!

Follow the Closet Fantasy Blogger's scribd account on this link for sheet music, occasional case digests, and of course--my pride and joy--Oblicon for Dummies!!!!!!11shiftone by CMG Lucero!

This is a work in progress, simultaneous with my Oblicon (mis)adventures. Enjoy reading, as I enjoyed writing! :)

Murder and Homicide

Murder vs Homicide

Murder - nag-effort ka talagang pumatay ng tao

• with treachery and superior strength
•  in consideration of a price/reward/promise or perhaps even profit
• using really destructive means like fire, poison, explosions, motor vehicle assault, etc
• while there is a natural or public calamity
•  pag nag premeditate ka
•  at pag inhumanly cruel at brutal ka, and you sneer at the person/corpse)

Homicide - pag nakapatay ka ng tao pero hindi present yung mga elements sa taas

Nahihirapan ako somewhat sa translation ng "pumatay ng tao" at "nakapatay ng tao" dito.

Take this for example. 

A killed B. (walang indication kung murder or homicide.) 

Now translate it into Filipino, at may dalawa o higit ka pang possible translation. 

Pinatay ni A si B. (possibly murder 'to)

Napatay ni A si B. (possibly homicide 'to)

One of the most fun reads I've had in a long time :)

Antero J. Pobre vs. Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago

Antero J. Pobre vs. Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, A.C. No. 7399 August 25, 2009

i.e., Miriam Baliw vs. Supreme Court of Idiots 

Facts: Sa kanyang privilege speech sa Senado, sinabi ni Senador Miriam Defensor-Santiago ang: 

I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots. 

Iniinvoke naman ng aking paboritong senador ang kanyang constitutional rights bilang isang miyembro ng Kongreso (parliamentary immunity). May mga nakatala (tulad ni Pobre) na ang pahayag na ito ng senadorang may kaunting tililing ay bunga ng hindi pag-a-appoint sa kanya bilang Chief Justice. 

Issue: Kung si Miriam Baliw ba ay administratively liable dahil sa pahayag niyang ito, at kung abuso ba ito ng kanyang mga karapatan bilang isang senador. 

Held: Baliw si Miriam at talagang baliw siya; bitter na bitter rin siya nang hindi siya naging Chief Justice. Lol. 

Eto seryoso na. 
Isinaad ng Korte Suprema na ang Senadora ay indeed, may constitutional rights na makikita sa Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution, which provides: “A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.” Ika ng Korte Suprema, isa ang free speech sa mga pundasyon ng demokrasya. 


Ngunit kahit may parliamentary rights siya na naka-mandate sa Konstitusyon, pinagalitan pa rin ng Korte Suprema ang senadora. 

The Court wishes to express its deep concern about the language Senator Santiago, a member of the Bar, used in her speech and its effect on the administration of justice. To the Court, the lady senator has undoubtedly crossed the limits of decency and good professional conduct. It is at once apparent that her statements in question were intemperate and highly improper in substance. 

Ayon na rin sa Korte Suprema, nasa Senado na ang opisyal na hatol kay Miriam Baliw, dahil Rules of the House ang kanyang nilabag. 
Huling hirit ng Korte Suprema:  It is unfortunate that her peers bent backwards and avoided imposing their own rules on her. i.e., #$%^&*&^%$#$%^&* dahil sa separation of powers, wala tayong magawa noong ininsulto tayo ng luka-lokang iyon dahil hindi natin siya saklaw. 
Nakanino ang huling halakhak?
"I lied." *hysterical laughter*

Pobre vs. Defensor-Santiago

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 7399               August 25, 2009

ANTERO J. POBRE, Complainant,
vs.
Sen. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

VELASCO, JR., J.:

In his sworn letter/complaint dated December 22, 2006, with enclosures, Antero J. Pobre invites the Court’s attention to the following excerpts of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago’s speech delivered on the Senate floor:

x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x.

To Pobre, the foregoing statements reflected a total disrespect on the part of the speaker towards then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and the other members of the Court and constituted direct contempt of court. Accordingly, Pobre asks that disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions be taken against the lady senator.

In her comment on the complaint dated April 25, 2007, Senator Santiago, through counsel, does not deny making the aforequoted statements. She, however, explained that those statements were covered by the constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity, being part of a speech she delivered in the discharge of her duty as member of Congress or its committee. The purpose of her speech, according to her, was to bring out in the open controversial anomalies in governance with a view to future remedial legislation. She averred that she wanted to expose what she believed "to be an unjust act of the Judicial Bar Council [JBC]," which, after sending out public invitations for nomination to the soon to-be vacated position of Chief Justice, would eventually inform applicants that only incumbent justices of the Supreme Court would qualify for nomination. She felt that the JBC should have at least given an advanced advisory that non-sitting members of the Court, like her, would not be considered for the position of Chief Justice.

The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on the provision of Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution, which provides: "A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session.No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof." Explaining the import of the underscored portion of the provision, the Court, in Osmeña, Jr. v. Pendatun, said:

Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose "is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success" for "it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech and that he should be protected from resentment of every one, however, powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offense."¹

As American jurisprudence puts it, this legislative privilege is founded upon long experience and arises as a means of perpetuating inviolate the functioning process of the legislative department. Without parliamentary immunity, parliament, or its equivalent, would degenerate into a polite and ineffective debating forum. Legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their legislative duties, not for their private indulgence, but for the public good. The privilege would be of little value if they could be subjected to the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against them based upon a judge’s speculation as to the motives.²

This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in upholding the institution of parliamentary immunity and promotion of free speech. Neither has the Court lost sight of the importance of the legislative and oversight functions of the Congress that enable this representative body to look diligently into every affair of government, investigate and denounce anomalies, and talk about how the country and its citizens are being served. Courts do not interfere with the legislature or its members in the manner they perform their functions in the legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of the statement uttered by the member of the Congress does not destroy the privilege.³ The disciplinary authority of the assembly⁴ and the voters, not the courts, can properly discourage or correct such abuses committed in the name of parliamentary immunity.⁵

For the above reasons, the plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal of the complaint for disbarment or disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court. It is felt, however, that this could not be the last word on the matter.

The Court wishes to express its deep concern about the language Senator Santiago, a member of the Bar, used in her speech and its effect on the administration of justice. To the Court, the lady senator has undoubtedly crossed the limits of decency and good professional conduct. It is at once apparent that her statements in question were intemperate and highly improper in substance. To reiterate, she was quoted as stating that she wanted "to spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court," and calling the Court a "Supreme Court of idiots."

The lady senator alluded to In Re: Vicente Sotto.⁶ We draw her attention to the ensuing passage in Sotto that she should have taken to heart in the first place:

x x x [I]f the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos would be the result.1avvp

No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the respect due to the courts should be allowed to erode the people’s faith in the judiciary. In this case, the lady senator clearly violated Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which respectively provide:

Canon 8, Rule 8.01.––A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.

Canon 11.––A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to the judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.

Senator/Atty. Santiago is a cut higher than most lawyers. Her achievements speak for themselves. She was a former Regional Trial Court judge, a law professor, an oft-cited authority on constitutional and international law, an author of numerous law textbooks, and an elected senator of the land. Needless to stress, Senator Santiago, as a member of the Bar and officer of the court, like any other, is duty-bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court and to maintain the respect due its members. Lawyers in public service are keepers of public faith and are burdened with the higher degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than their brethren in private practice.⁷Senator Santiago should have known, as any perceptive individual, the impact her statements would make on the people’s faith in the integrity of the courts.

As Senator Santiago alleged, she delivered her privilege speech as a prelude to crafting remedial legislation on the JBC. This allegation strikes the Court as an afterthought in light of the insulting tenor of what she said. We quote the passage once more:

x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. Iam nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x. (Emphasis ours.)

A careful re-reading of her utterances would readily show that her statements were expressions of personal anger and frustration at not being considered for the post of Chief Justice. In a sense, therefore, her remarks were outside the pale of her official parliamentary functions. Even parliamentary immunity must not be allowed to be used as a vehicle to ridicule, demean, and destroy the reputation of the Court and its magistrates, nor as armor for personal wrath and disgust. Authorities are agreed that parliamentary immunity is not an individual privilege accorded the individual members of the Parliament or Congress for their personal benefit, but rather a privilege for the benefit of the people and the institution that represents them.

To be sure, Senator Santiago could have given vent to her anger without indulging in insulting rhetoric and offensive personalities.

Lest it be overlooked, Senator Santiago’s outburst was directly traceable to what she considered as an "unjust act" the JBC had taken in connection with her application for the position of Chief Justice. But while the JBC functions under the Court’s supervision, its individual members, save perhaps for the Chief Justice who sits as the JBC’s ex-officio chairperson,⁸ have no official duty to nominate candidates for appointment to the position of Chief Justice. The Court is, thus, at a loss to understand Senator Santiago’s wholesale and indiscriminate assault on the members of the Court and her choice of critical and defamatory words against all of them.

At any event, equally important as the speech and debate clause of Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution is Sec. 5(5) of Art. VIII of the Constitution that provides:

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

x x x x

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of the law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. (Emphasis ours.)

The Court, besides being authorized to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, exercises specific authority to promulgate rules governing the Integrated Bar with the end in view that the integration of the Bar will, among other things:

(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except within its own forum, from the assaults that politics and self interest may level at it, and assist it to maintain its integrity, impartiality and independence;

x x x x

(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards x x x.⁹

In Re: Letter Dated 21 February 2005 of Atty. Noel S. Sorreda,¹⁰ we reiterated our pronouncement in Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer¹¹ that the duty of attorneys to the courts can only be maintained by rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial office which they are bound to uphold. The Court wrote in Rheem of the Philippines:

x x x As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that "[i]t is the duty of a lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance." That same canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts against "unjust criticism and clamor." And more. The attorney’s oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be "with all good fidelity x x x to the courts."

Also, in Sorreda, the Court revisited its holding in Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel¹² that:

A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice." His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, "not to promote distrust in the administration of justice." Faith in the courts, a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to undermine the judicial edifice "is disastrous to the continuity of government and to the attainment of the liberties of the people." Thus has it been said of a lawyer that "[a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice."¹³

The lady senator belongs to the legal profession bound by the exacting injunction of a strict Code. Society has entrusted that profession with the administration of the law and dispensation of justice. Generally speaking, a lawyer holding a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct committed while in the discharge of official duties, unless said misconduct also constitutes a violation of his/her oath as a lawyer.¹⁴

Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct committed in their private capacity, as long as their misconduct reflects their want of probity or good demeanor,¹⁵ a good character being an essential qualification for the admission to the practice of law and for continuance of such privilege. When the Code of Professional Responsibility or the Rules of Court speaks of "conduct" or "misconduct," the reference is not confined to one’s behavior exhibited in connection with the performance of lawyers’ professional duties, but also covers any misconduct, which––albeit unrelated to the actual practice of their profession––would show them to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which their license and the law invest in them.¹⁶

This Court, in its unceasing quest to promote the people’s faith in courts and trust in the rule of law, has consistently exercised its disciplinary authority on lawyers who, for malevolent purpose or personal malice, attempt to obstruct the orderly administration of justice, trifle with the integrity of courts, and embarrass or, worse, malign the men and women who compose them. We have done it in the case of former Senator Vicente Sotto in Sotto, in the case of Atty. Noel Sorreda in Sorreda, and in the case of Atty. Francisco B. Cruz in Tacordan v. Ang¹⁷ who repeatedly insulted and threatened the Court in a most insolent manner.

The Court is not hesitant to impose some form of disciplinary sanctions on Senator/Atty. Santiago for what otherwise would have constituted an act of utter disrespect on her part towards the Court and its members. The factual and legal circumstances of this case, however, deter the Court from doing so, even without any sign of remorse from her. Basic constitutional consideration dictates this kind of disposition.

We, however, would be remiss in our duty if we let the Senator’s offensive and disrespectful language that definitely tended to denigrate the institution pass by. It is imperative on our part to re-instill in Senator/Atty. Santiago her duty to respect courts of justice, especially this Tribunal, and remind her anew that the parliamentary non-accountability thus granted to members of Congress is not to protect them against prosecutions for their own benefit, but to enable them, as the people’s representatives, to perform the functions of their office without fear of being made responsible before the courts or other forums outside the congressional hall.¹⁸ It is intended to protect members of Congress against government pressure and intimidation aimed at influencing the decision-making prerogatives of Congress and its members.

The Rules of the Senate itself contains a provision on Unparliamentary Acts and Language that enjoins a Senator from using, under any circumstance, "offensive or improper language against another Senator or against any public institution."¹⁹ But as to Senator Santiago’s unparliamentary remarks, the Senate President had not apparently called her to order, let alone referred the matter to the Senate Ethics Committee for appropriate disciplinary action, as the Rules dictates under such circumstance.²⁰ The lady senator clearly violated the rules of her own chamber. It is unfortunate that her peers bent backwards and avoided imposing their own rules on her.

Finally, the lady senator questions Pobre’s motives in filing his complaint, stating that disciplinary proceedings must be undertaken solely for the public welfare. We cannot agree with her more. We cannot overstress that the senator’s use of intemperate language to demean and denigrate the highest court of the land is a clear violation of the duty of respect lawyers owe to the courts.²¹

Finally, the Senator asserts that complainant Pobre has failed to prove that she in fact made the statements in question. Suffice it to say in this regard that, although she has not categorically denied making such statements, she has unequivocally said making them as part of her privilege speech. Her implied admission is good enough for the Court.

WHEREFORE, the letter-complaint of Antero J. Pobre against Senator/Atty. Miriam Defensor-Santiago is, conformably to Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution, DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES* Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice