People vs. Burgos (G.R. No. L-68955 September 4, 1986)

G.R. No. L-68955 September 4, 1986

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 
vs.
RUBEN BURGOS y TITO, defendant-appellant.

Facts: Defendant is charged with illegal possession of firearm in furtherance of subversion (tasks such as recruiting members to the NPA and collection of contributions from its members) and found guilty by the RTC of Digos, Davao del Sur. From the information filed by the police authorities upon the information given by Masamlok, allegedly a man defendant tried to recruit into the NPA, the police authorities arrest defendant and had his house searched. Subsequently, certain NPA-related documents and a firearm, allegedly issued and used by one Alias Cmdr. Pol of the NPA, are confiscated. Defendant denies being involved in any subversive activities and claims that he has been tortured in order to accept ownership of subject firearm and that his alleged extrajudicial statements have been made only under fear, threat and intimidation on his person and his family. He avers that his arrest is unlawful as it is done without valid warrant, that the trial court erred in holding the search warrant in his house for the firearm lawful, and that the trial court erred in holding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of PD 9 in relation to GOs 6and 7.

Issue: If defendant’s arrest, the search of his home, and the subsequent confiscation of a firearm and several NPA-related documents are lawful.

Held: Records disclose that when the police went to defendant’s house to arrest him upon the information given by Masamlok, they had neither search nor arrest warrant with them—in wanton violation of ArtIV, Sec 3 (now Art III, sec 2). As the Court held in Villanueva vs Querubin, the state, however powerful, doesn’t have access to a man’s home, his haven of refuge where his individuality can assert itself in his choice of welcome and in the kind of objects he wants around him. In the traditional formulation, a man’s house, however humble, is his castle, and thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by the government.

The trial court justified the warrantless arrest under Rule 113 Sec 6 of the RoC:

a)          When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to commit an offense in his presence;

b)          When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed it;

c)          When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another

and the confiscation of the firearm under Rule 126, Sec 12:

A person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense.

However, the trial court has erred in its conclusion that said warrantless arrest is under the ambit of aforementioned RoC. At the time of defendant’s arrest, he wasn’t in actual possession of any firearm or subversive document, and was not committing any “subversive” act—he was plowing his field. It is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime in a warrantless arrest. An essential precondition is that a crime must have beenin fact or actually have been committed first; it isn’t enough to suspect a crime may have been committed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator. The Court also finds no compelling reason for the haste with which the arresting officers sought to arrest the accused. We fail to see why they failed to first go through the process of obtaining a warrant of arrest, if indeed they had reasonable ground to believe that the accused had truly committed a crime. There is no showing that there was a real apprehension that the accused was on the verge of flight or escape. Likewise, there is no showing that the whereabouts of the accused were unknown.

In proving the ownership of the questioned firearm and alleged subversive documents, assuming they were really illegal, the defendant was never informed of his constitutional rights at the time of his arrest; thus the admissions obtained are in violation of the constitutional right against self-incrimination under Sec 20 Art IV (now Sec 12, Art III) and thus inadmissible as evidence.

Furthermore, the defendant was not accorded his constitutional right to be assisted by counsel during the custodial interrogation. His extra-judicial confession, the firearm, and the alleged subversive documents are all inadmissible as evidence. In light of the aforementioned, defendant is acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt of the crime with which he has been charged. Subject firearm and alleged subversive documents have been disposed of in accordance with law.

The Court also maintains that violations of human rights do not help in overcoming a rebellion. Reiterating Morales vs Enrile, “while the government should continue to repel the communists, the subversives, the rebels, and the lawless with the means at its command, it should always be remembered that whatever action is taken must always be within the framework of our Constitution and our laws.”

Stonehill vs. Diokno

G.R. No. L-19550             June 19, 1967

HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL BECK, petitioners, 
vs.
HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in his capacity as Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST. FISCAL MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE HERMOGENES CALUAG, Court of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of Quezon City, respondents.

Facts: Petitioners, who have prior deportation cases pending, and the corporation they form were alleged to committed "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code,” to which they were served 4 search warrants, directing any peace officer to search petitioners’  persons and/or premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences for: “books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).”

The items allegedly illegally obtained can be classified into two groups: (1) those found and seized in the offices of aforementioned corporations, and (2) those found in petitioners’ residences.

Petitioners aver that the warrant is illegal for, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law x x x.

Respondent-prosecutors invoke the Moncado vs People’s Court ruling: even if the searches and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners herein.

Issue: Validity of the search warrants.

Held: The SC ruled in favor of Stonehill et. al., reversing the Moncado doctrine. Though Stonehill et. al. are not the proper parties to assail the validity of the search warrant issued against their corporation and thus they have no cause of action (only the officers or board members of said corporation may assail said warrant, and that corporations have personalities distinct from petitioners’ personalities), the 3 warrants issued to search petitioners’ residences are hereby declared void. Thus, the searches and seizures made therein are made illegal.

The constitution protects the people’s right against unreasonable search and seizure. It provides:

 (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and

 (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. 


In the case at bar, none of these are met.

 The warrant was issued from mere allegation that petitioners  committed a “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code.” As no specific violation has been alleged, it was impossible for the judges who issued said warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed or committed violations of the law. In other words, it would be a legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code,” — as alleged in the aforementioned applications — without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or codes. General warrants are also to be eliminated, as the legality or illegality of petitioners’ transactions is immaterial to the invalidity of the general warrant that sought these effects to be searched and seized: “Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss statements.”

The Court also holds that the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures is, in the language of the Federal Supreme Court:  x x x  If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his rights to be secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land. 

People vs Marti

G.R. No. 81561 January 18, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
vs.
ANDRE MARTI, accused-appellant.

Facts: The proprietors of Manila Packing and Export Forwarders, following standard operating procedure, opened four gift wrapped boxes from which emerged a peculiar odor. They reported this to the NBI on the same day, and in the presence of said agents, opened the boxes which contained marijuana. The NBI filed an information against appellant for violation of RA 6425, Dangerous Drugs Act, but appellant contended that the evidence had been obtained in violation of consti rights against unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of communication.

Issue: May an act of a private individual without the intervention and participation of the State, and allegedly in violation of appellant’s constitutional rights, be invoked against the State?

Held: No. It was the proprietor of the forwarding agency who made search/inspection of the packages, not the NBI, as appellant would have the Court believe. Said inspection was reasonable and a standard operating procedure on the part of the proprietor as a precautionary measure before delivery of packages to the Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Posts. Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search the proprietor effected into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search.

Outlawed is any unwarranted intrusion by the government, which is called upon to refrain from any invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life. However, in the absence of governmental interference, the liberties granted by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State. As held in Bernas vs. US, the Fourth Amendment and the law applying to it do not require exclusion of evidence obtained through a search by a private citizen; rather the amendment only proscribes government action. To agree with appellant that an act of a private individual in violation of the Bill of Rights should also be construed as an act of the State would result in serious legal complications and an absurd interpretation of the constitution.

The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.

People vs Cayat

G.R. No. L-45987             May 5, 1939

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 
vs.
CAYAT, defendant-appellant

Facts:

Cayat was a native from Baguio, Benguet, Mt. Province who was found guilty of violation of Sections 2 and 3 of Act 1639: It shall be unlawful for any native of the Philippine Islands who is a member of a non-Christian tribe within the meaning of the Act Numbered Thirteen hundred and ninety-seven, to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of this Act, except as provided in section one hereof; and it shall be the duty of any police officer or other duly authorized agent of the Insular or any provincial, municipal or township government to seize and forthwith destroy any such liquors found unlawfully in the possession of any member of a non-Christian tribe.

SEC. 3. Any person violating the provisions of section one or section two of this Act shall, upon conviction thereof, be punishable for each offense by a fine of not exceeding two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, in the discretion of the court.

Issues:

1.      If  said law is discriminatory and denies EP of laws;

2.      If said law is an improper exercise of the police power of the state.

Held:

1.     Said statute does not deny EP of laws; the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. And the classification, to be reasonable:

a.      must rest on substantial distinctions;

b.      must be germane to the purposes of the law;

c.       must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

d.      must apply equally to all members of the same class.

Act 1639 meets all such requirements. The classification rests on real and substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon "accident of birth or parentage” but upon the degree of civilization and culture. "The term 'non-Christian tribes' refers, not to religious belief, but to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities.

When the public safety or the public morals require the discontinuance of a certain practice by certain class of persons, the hand of the Legislature cannot be stayed from providing for its discontinuance by any incidental inconvenience which some members of the class may suffer. The private interests of such members must yield to the paramount interests of the nation. The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as "an inferior or less capable race." On the contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the public policy towards them rest upon a recognition of their inherent right to equality in that enjoyment of those privileges now enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as there can be no true equality before the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in education, the government has endeavored, by appropriate measures, to raise their culture and civilization and secure for them the benefits of their progress, with the ultimate end in view of placing them with their Christian brothers on the basis of true equality.

The prohibition is germane to the purposes of the law. It is designed to insure peace and order in and among the non- Christian tribes has often resulted in lawlessness and crime thereby hampering the efforts of the government to raise their standards of life and civilization. This law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of the enactment. It is intended to apply for all times as long as those conditions exists. The Act applies equally to all members of the class. That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number of non- Christians by reason of their degree of culture is not an argument against the equality of its operation nor affect the reasonableness of the classification thus established.

2.      Said statute is not an improper exercise of the PPS. Any measure intended to promote the health, peace, morals, education, and good order of the people or to increase the industries of the state, develop its resources and add to its wealth and prosperity is legitimate exercise of police power, unless shown to be whimsical or capricious as to unduly interfere with the rights of an individual. Act 1639 is designed to promote peace and order to non-Christian tribes and to eventually hasten their equalization and unification with the rest of their Christian brothers.

Ormoc Sugar Company Inc. vs Treasurer of Ormoc City

G.R. No. L-23794     February 17, 1968
ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. THE TREASURER OF ORMOC CITY, THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF ORMOC CITY, HON. ESTEBAN C. CONEJOS as Mayor of Ormoc City and ORMOC CITY, Defendants-Appellees.

Facts:

The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed a municipal tax ordinance imposing on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company Inc. one percent per export sale to the US and other foreign countries. Said company filed before the CFI of Leyte a complaint against the City of Ormoc, its Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor, alleging sasid ordinance is violative of the equal protection clause and the rule of uniformity of taxation, among other things.  Ormoc Sugar Company Inc. was the only sugar central in Ormoc City at the time.

Issue:

WON the constitutional limits on the power of taxation, specifically the EPC and uniformity of taxation, were infringed.

Held:

Yes. Though Ormoc Sugar Company Inc. is the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc at the time, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. Said ordinance shoouldn’t be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, for coverage of the tax.

EPC applies only to persons or things identically situated and doesn’t bar a reasonable classificationof the subject of legislation. A classification is reasonable where: 1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class.