Legal Schizophrenia

The most recent developments in the Corona impeachment has led to a schism in my thoughts, mainly between Consuelo, Atty-Trying-To-Be (let's call her "Connie"), and Elo, the ordinary person with a rather moody streak of Marxism (she's just plain old "Elo" for the rest of this text). Connie, a student of law, must always be prepared to think both ways--how to convict as well as defend any client in any case that might arise, wherein guilt of the accused or otherwise is immaterial. She must sift through facts, know the proper laws and jurisprudence to help the accused get away with their offenses (if any), and at the last, most desperate moment, summon legalities and/or technicalities to hide the blemishes and imperfections of the actions and/or ommissions of the accused. Connie has no room in her mind or heart to doubt the accused, as she must believe (the proper legal term is "presume") the innocence of the accused, until proven guilty. Connie cannot employ anything other than the rigid words of the law and the science that lies behind it. 

Elo, on the other hand, can be guided by intuition, speculative and investigative notions, and even public opinion. She can join the mob for or against the accused, engage in the more popular choice, and ride with popular views and thus be deemed wise. She can rely on investigative journalism (i.e., chismis na ni-"research" ng mga tulad ni Marites Vitug) and listen unencumberedly to street arguments regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused. She can join demonstrations demanding the disclosure of facts hidden behind sacred robes, desecrating the most immaculate rules without fear or care for (being held in) contempt. She can hide behind "the people's will," never really caring that "the people" she thinks she represents is but a class, a minority or a majority, but probably never really representative of the population of this godforsaken country who gives not a fuck about the guilt or otherwise of the accused. Most of all, she can air opinions. informed or otherwise, appealing to the hearts and emotions of listeners rather to cold hard laws which though harsh are still laws. She can always hide behind the Augustinian principle of "an unjust law is no law" anyway, or even "the voice of the people is the voice of God." 

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. ANIANO DESIERTO, as Ombudsman, EDUARDO C. CONJUANCO, JR., JUAN PONCE ENRILE, MA. CLARA S. LOBREGAT, ROLANDO DE LA CUESTA, JOSE C. CONCEPCION, JOSE R. MENDOZA, EMMANUEL M. ALAMEDA, HERMENEGILDO C. ZAYCO, TEODORA A. REGALA, AMADO C. MAMURIC, DOUGLAS LU YM, JAIME GANDIAGA, NARCISO PINEDA and DANILO S. URSUA, respondents.

[G.R. No. 131966. September 23, 2002]


Facts: Respondents, subordinates and close associates of Dictator Marcos, are members of the Boards of Directors of United Coconut Planter Bank and United Coconut Oil Mills, Inc. They are charged with taking undue advantage of their public office and close relationship with Dictator Marcos in unlawfully misappropriating huge amounts of coconut levy funds in connection with the acquisition of 16 oil mills in order to establish a monopoly, violating RA 3019 (Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act). The PCGG then transmitted the case to the Office of the Ombudsman for appropriate action, OMB-0-90-2811. Thereafter, the Graft Investigation Officer II, Amanete, issued a resolution recommending the dismissal of said case, finding no sufficient evidence to believe that violation of Anti-Graft Law was committed.


Petitioner filed with the SC a x x x petition for certiorari on the ff grounds: (a) respondents made convenient use of PD 961, PD 1468 and LOI 926 to carry out their grand design to establish a coco monopoly to the detriment of poor coco farmers; (b) there is no legal basis for the contention that the acts of respondents had been decriminalized; and (c) allegations in the complaint are deemed admitted as respondents failed to submit their counter-affidavit.


Respondents Regala and Concepcion contend, inter alia, that petitioner has no cause of action against them because their acts were performed in the course of their duties as counsels.


Issues:
1. If the petition should be entertained though it was filed by the PCGG without the intervention of the OSG.
2. If respondents Regala and Concepcion should be dropped as paties-defendants in OMB-0-90-2811.


Held:
1. The ends of substantial justice affords an exception that the OSG should have filed he instant petition in behalf of the Republic. If the ends of substantial justice would be better served, and the issues in the action could be determined in a more just, speedy and inexpensive manner, then the petititon shold be entertained, even assuming arguendo that the PCGG has no authority to file said petition.


2. Yes. In Castillo vs Sandiganbayan and Republic of the Philippines, the Court excluded lawyer Gregorio Castillo as party-defendant to the case, citing Regala vs. Sandiganbayan. x x x The Ombudsman is directed to proceed with the preliminary investigation of OMB-0-90-2811 and to exclude respondents Regala and Concepcion as defendants therein.

In Re: The Corona and UST PhD Debate (My Main Point being Journalistic Issues, with Points Distantly Related to Maria Ozawa)

These past few days, the Philippine Daily Inquirer ran articles questioning Chief Justice Corona's doctor of laws degree from the four hundred-year-old University of Santo Tomas. Marites Danguilan-Vitug, author of Shadow of Doubt: Probing the Supreme Court, has an article in the January 1, 2012 issue of the said newspaper questioning UST's conferment of said degree to the Chief Justice. (As of now, the online article in the PDI website has been taken down. However, other blogs have recorded the text, which though might seem less credible than the PDI, must do for now.) On January 2, the PDI ran another story, this time not a headline under a banner held by two fat cherubs hailing the new year, that contained UST's side of the coin.


As much as I dislike Corona and think there really are things that should not be where they are, I am of the opinion that the Philippine Daily Inquirer committed a culpable negligence of sorts when it published Vitug's article without getting the side of the University of Santo Tomas. Would it have been too much to wait for the school's answer, seeing as that story isn't really too perishable? And what would it say of the PDI's credibility in running a second story telling the other side of the coin, a day after the seemingly-biased first article was printed?


This whole thing reminds me of a much less serious topic, albeit should be of the same journalistic touch. Almost a month ago, ABS-CBN Interactive launched a story about how Japanese AV idol Maria Ozawa allegedly was inviting Filipino males for an audition for her next film. A couple of my hot-blooded male friends posted this link on their FBs, but several hours later GMA News launched a story of thinking-before-clicking: apparently, "Maria Ozawa" was the creation of a couple of men who had nothing better to do. The real porn star released no such statement, much less ask anybody of any nationality about a bukkake audition. ABS-CBN of course edited their story, and boys all around were groaning, "Oh, man!"


Going back to Corona, UST, and Vitug. I want to make it clear that I am not a Corona apologist, nor a graduate of UST defending her alma mater. (I actually finished my undergrad at UP, if you're interested, and I'm currently hanging on by a thread at San Beda Law.) But as someone who wants to enter the practice of law and hopefully work in the SC one day, and as a writer in general, I just want to say that publishing Vitug's story on the first day of 2012, under a banner of cherubs holding up a Happy New Year banner, reeks of bias and even righteous glee against Corona. Is that some sort of poetic/journalistic justice against Corona, who has long been accused of being biased in favor of Arroyo?


Read Vitug's article here in this Tumblr post (I can assure you, it's the real thing), or in the Rapper page (if you're not taking my word for the Tumblr post, but I bet they'll pull this down soon). You decide if I'm just rambling like a lunatic here, or if I do have a valid point.

The Sea Bell | JRR Tolkien

I walked by the sea, and there came to me, 
as a star-beam on the wet sand, 
a white shell like a sea-bell; 
trembling it lay in my wet hand. 
In my fingers shaken I heard waken 
a ding within, by a harbour bar 
a buoy swinging, a call ringing 
over endless seas, faint now and far. 


Then I saw a boat silently float 
On the night-tide, empty and grey. 
‘It is later than late! Why do we wait?' 
I lept in and cried: ‘Bear me away!' 


It bore me away, wetted with spray, 
wrapped in a mist, wound in a sleep, 
to a forgotten strand in a strange land. 
In the twilight beyond the deep 
I heard a sea-bell swing in the swell, 
dinging, dinging, and the breakers roar 
on the hidden teeth of a perilous reef; 
and at last I came to a long shore. 
White it glimmered, and the sea simmered 
with star-mirrors in a silver net; 
cliffs of stone pale as ruel-bone 
in the moon-foam were gleaming wet. 
Glittering sand slid through my hand, 
Dust of pearl and jewel-grist, 
Trumpets of opal, roses of coral, 
Flutes of green and amethyst. 
But under cliff-eaves there were glooming caves, 
weed-curtained, dark and grey' 
a cold air stirred in my hair, 
and the light waned, as I hurried away. 


Down from a hill ran a green rill; 
its water I drank to my heart's ease. 
Up its fountain-stair to a country fair 
of ever-eve I came, far from the seas, 
dclimbing into meadows of fluttering shadows; 
flowers lay there like fallen stars, 
and on a blue pool, glassy and cool, 
like floating moons the nenuphars. 
Alders were sleeping, and willows weeping 
by a slow river of rippling weeds; 
gladdon-swords guarded the fords, 
and green spears, and arrow-reeds. 


There was echo of song all the evening long 
down in the valley, many a thing 
running to and fro: hares white as snow, 
voles out of holes; moths on the wing 
with lantern-eyes; in quiet surpise 
brocks were staring out of dard doors. 
I heard dancing there, music in the air, 
feet going quick on the green floors. 
But wherever I came it was ever the same: 
the feet fled, and all was still; 
never a greeting, only the fleeting 
pipes, voices, horns on the hill. 


Of river-leaves and the rush-sheaves 
I made me a mantle of jewel-green, 
a tall wand to hold, and a flag of gold; 
my eyes shone like the star-sheen. 
With flowers crowned I stood on a mound, 
and shrill as a call at cock-crow? 
Why do none speak, wherever I go? 
Here now I stand, king of this land, 
with gladdon-sword and reed-mace. 
Answer my call! Come forth all! 
Speak to me words! Show me a face!' 


Black came a cloud as a night-shroud. 
Like a dark mole groping I went, 
to the ground falling, on my hands crawling 
with eyes blind and my back bent. 
I crept to a wood: silent it stood 
in its dead leaves; bare were its boughs. 
There must I sit, wandering in wit, 
while owls snored in their hollow house. 
For a year and day there must I stay: 
beetles were tapping in the rotten trees, 
spiders were weaving, in the mould heaving 
puffballs loomed about my knees. 


At last there came light in my long night, 
and I saw my hair hanging grey. 
‘Bent though I be, I must find the sea! 
I have lost myself, ,and I know not the way, 
but let me be gone!' Then I stumbled on; 
like a hunting bat shadow was over me; 
in my ears dinned a withering wind, 
and with ragged briars I tried to cover me. 
My hands were torn and my knees worn, 
and years were heavy upon my back, 
when the rain in my face took a salt taste, 
and I smelled the smell of sea-wrack. 


Birds came sailing, mewing, wailing; 
I heard voices in cold caves, 
seals barking, and rocks snarling, 
and in spout-holes the gulping of waves. 
Winter came fast; into a mist I passed, 
to land's end my years I bore; 
Snow was in the air, ice in my hair, 
darkness was lying on the last shore. 


There still afloat waited the boat, 
in the tide lifting, its prow tossing. 
Wearily I lay, as it bore me away, 
the waves climbing, the seas crossing, 
passing old hulls clustered with gulls 
and great ships laden with light, 
coming to haven, dark as a raven, 
silent as snow, deep in the night. 


Houses were shuttered, wind round them muttered, 
roads were empty. I sat by a door, 
and where drizzling rain poured down a drain 
I cast away all that I bore: 
in my clutching hand some grains of sand, 
And a sea-shell silent and dead. 
Never will my ear that bell hear, 
never my feet that shore tread, 
never again, as in sad lane, 
in blind alley and in long street 
ragged I walk. To myself I talk; 
For still they speak not, men that meet.

Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado (G.R. No. 105371 November 11, 1993)

G.R. No. 105371 November 11, 1993

THE PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION, duly rep. by its President, BERNARDO P. ABESAMIS, Vice-President for Legal Affairs, MARIANO M. UMALI, Director for Pasig, Makati, and Pasay, Metro Manila, ALFREDO C. FLORES, and Chairman of the Committee on Legal Aid, JESUS G. BERSAMIRA, Presiding Judges of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 85, Quezon City and Branches 160, 167 and 166, Pasig, Metro Manila, respectively: the NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF THE JUDGES ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, composed of the METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT JUDGES ASSOCIATION rep. by its President. REINATO QUILALA of the MUNICIPAL TRIAL CIRCUIT COURT, Manila; THE MUNICIPAL JUDGES LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES rep. by its President, TOMAS G. TALAVERA; by themselves and in behalf of all the Judges of the Regional Trial and Shari'a Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal Courts throughout the Country, petitioners, 
vs.
HON. PETE PRADO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications, JORGE V. SARMIENTO, in his capacity as Postmaster General, and the PHILIPPINE POSTAL CORP., respondents.

Facts: Petitioners, members of the lower courts, are assailing the constitutionality of Sec 35 of RA 7354 due to, inter alia, its being discriminatory because of withdrawing the franking privilege from the Judiciary but retaining said privilege for the President, the VP, members of Congress, the Comelec, former Presidents, and the National Census and Statistics Office. Respondents counter that there is no discrimination as the franking privilege has also been withdrawn from the Office of Adult Education, the Institute of National Language, the Telecommunications Office, the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation, the National Historical Commission, the AFP, the AFP Ladies Steering Committee, the City and Provincial Prosecutors, the Tanodbayan (Office of the Special Prosecutor), the Kabataang Baranggay, the Commission on the Filipino Language, the Provincial and City Assessors, and the National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons.

Issue: Constitutionality of Sec. 35of RA 7354

Held: Hereby declared unconstitutional.

The EPC is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed, 12 Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others. The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or things without distinction. In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been withdrawn, Section 35 has placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and the members of Congress for the franking privilege, there is no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater need on the part of the Judiciary for such privilege. While we may appreciate the withdrawal of the franking privilege from the Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, we fail to understand why the Supreme Court should be similarly treated as that Committee.

In the SC’s view, the only acceptable reason for the grant of the franking privilege was the perceived need of the grantee for the accommodation, which would justify a waiver of substantial revenue by the Corporation in the interest of providing for a smoother flow of communication between the government and the people. If the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy, it seems to us, is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of government, including those who do not need it. The problem is not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others, especially where there is no substantial distinction between those favored, which may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem is not solved by violating the Constitution.

People vs. Burgos (G.R. No. L-68955 September 4, 1986)

G.R. No. L-68955 September 4, 1986

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 
vs.
RUBEN BURGOS y TITO, defendant-appellant.

Facts: Defendant is charged with illegal possession of firearm in furtherance of subversion (tasks such as recruiting members to the NPA and collection of contributions from its members) and found guilty by the RTC of Digos, Davao del Sur. From the information filed by the police authorities upon the information given by Masamlok, allegedly a man defendant tried to recruit into the NPA, the police authorities arrest defendant and had his house searched. Subsequently, certain NPA-related documents and a firearm, allegedly issued and used by one Alias Cmdr. Pol of the NPA, are confiscated. Defendant denies being involved in any subversive activities and claims that he has been tortured in order to accept ownership of subject firearm and that his alleged extrajudicial statements have been made only under fear, threat and intimidation on his person and his family. He avers that his arrest is unlawful as it is done without valid warrant, that the trial court erred in holding the search warrant in his house for the firearm lawful, and that the trial court erred in holding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of PD 9 in relation to GOs 6and 7.

Issue: If defendant’s arrest, the search of his home, and the subsequent confiscation of a firearm and several NPA-related documents are lawful.

Held: Records disclose that when the police went to defendant’s house to arrest him upon the information given by Masamlok, they had neither search nor arrest warrant with them—in wanton violation of ArtIV, Sec 3 (now Art III, sec 2). As the Court held in Villanueva vs Querubin, the state, however powerful, doesn’t have access to a man’s home, his haven of refuge where his individuality can assert itself in his choice of welcome and in the kind of objects he wants around him. In the traditional formulation, a man’s house, however humble, is his castle, and thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by the government.

The trial court justified the warrantless arrest under Rule 113 Sec 6 of the RoC:

a)          When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to commit an offense in his presence;

b)          When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed it;

c)          When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another

and the confiscation of the firearm under Rule 126, Sec 12:

A person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense.

However, the trial court has erred in its conclusion that said warrantless arrest is under the ambit of aforementioned RoC. At the time of defendant’s arrest, he wasn’t in actual possession of any firearm or subversive document, and was not committing any “subversive” act—he was plowing his field. It is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime in a warrantless arrest. An essential precondition is that a crime must have beenin fact or actually have been committed first; it isn’t enough to suspect a crime may have been committed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator. The Court also finds no compelling reason for the haste with which the arresting officers sought to arrest the accused. We fail to see why they failed to first go through the process of obtaining a warrant of arrest, if indeed they had reasonable ground to believe that the accused had truly committed a crime. There is no showing that there was a real apprehension that the accused was on the verge of flight or escape. Likewise, there is no showing that the whereabouts of the accused were unknown.

In proving the ownership of the questioned firearm and alleged subversive documents, assuming they were really illegal, the defendant was never informed of his constitutional rights at the time of his arrest; thus the admissions obtained are in violation of the constitutional right against self-incrimination under Sec 20 Art IV (now Sec 12, Art III) and thus inadmissible as evidence.

Furthermore, the defendant was not accorded his constitutional right to be assisted by counsel during the custodial interrogation. His extra-judicial confession, the firearm, and the alleged subversive documents are all inadmissible as evidence. In light of the aforementioned, defendant is acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt of the crime with which he has been charged. Subject firearm and alleged subversive documents have been disposed of in accordance with law.

The Court also maintains that violations of human rights do not help in overcoming a rebellion. Reiterating Morales vs Enrile, “while the government should continue to repel the communists, the subversives, the rebels, and the lawless with the means at its command, it should always be remembered that whatever action is taken must always be within the framework of our Constitution and our laws.”

Stonehill vs. Diokno

G.R. No. L-19550             June 19, 1967

HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL BECK, petitioners, 
vs.
HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in his capacity as Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST. FISCAL MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE HERMOGENES CALUAG, Court of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of Quezon City, respondents.

Facts: Petitioners, who have prior deportation cases pending, and the corporation they form were alleged to committed "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code,” to which they were served 4 search warrants, directing any peace officer to search petitioners’  persons and/or premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences for: “books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).”

The items allegedly illegally obtained can be classified into two groups: (1) those found and seized in the offices of aforementioned corporations, and (2) those found in petitioners’ residences.

Petitioners aver that the warrant is illegal for, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law x x x.

Respondent-prosecutors invoke the Moncado vs People’s Court ruling: even if the searches and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners herein.

Issue: Validity of the search warrants.

Held: The SC ruled in favor of Stonehill et. al., reversing the Moncado doctrine. Though Stonehill et. al. are not the proper parties to assail the validity of the search warrant issued against their corporation and thus they have no cause of action (only the officers or board members of said corporation may assail said warrant, and that corporations have personalities distinct from petitioners’ personalities), the 3 warrants issued to search petitioners’ residences are hereby declared void. Thus, the searches and seizures made therein are made illegal.

The constitution protects the people’s right against unreasonable search and seizure. It provides:

 (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and

 (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. 


In the case at bar, none of these are met.

 The warrant was issued from mere allegation that petitioners  committed a “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code.” As no specific violation has been alleged, it was impossible for the judges who issued said warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed or committed violations of the law. In other words, it would be a legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code,” — as alleged in the aforementioned applications — without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or codes. General warrants are also to be eliminated, as the legality or illegality of petitioners’ transactions is immaterial to the invalidity of the general warrant that sought these effects to be searched and seized: “Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss statements.”

The Court also holds that the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures is, in the language of the Federal Supreme Court:  x x x  If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his rights to be secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.