Valenzuela vs. Kalayaan

SPOUSES JOSE T. VALENZUELA and GLORIA VALENZUELA, Petitioners,

vs.

KALAYAAN DEVELOPMENT & INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, Respondent.

G.R. No. 163244               June 22, 2009

Ponente: Peralta, J.

Facts: Kalayaan Development & Industrial Corporation discovered that Spouses Jose and Gloria Valenzuela had occupied and built a house on a parcel of land it owned, and demanded that they vacate said property. Upon negotiation, however, petitioners and Kalayaan entered a Contract to Sell wherein the petitioners would purchase 236 square meters of the subject property for P1,416,000 in twelve equal monthly installments. The contract further stated that upon failure to pay any of said installments, petitioners would be liable for liquidated penalty at 3% a month compounded monthly until fully paid. Kalayaan would also execute the deed of absolute sale only upon full payment.

Petitioners were only able to pay monthly installments amounting to a total of P208, 000.00. They then requested Kalayaan to issue a deed of sale for 118 square meters of the lot where their house stood, arguing that since they had paid half the purchase price, or a total of P708,000.00 representing 118 square meters of the property. Kalayaan, on the other hand, sent two demand letters asking petitioners to pay their outstanding obligation including agreed penalties.  

Gloria Valenzuela’s sister, Juliet Giron, assumed the remaining balance for the 118 square meters of the subject property at P10,000.00 per month to Kalayaan, which the latter accepted for and in behalf of Gloria. Thereafter, Kalayaan demanded that petitioners pay their outstanding obligation, but were unheeded. Kalyaan then filed a Complaint fot the Rescission of Contract and Damages against petitioners. The RTC of Caloocan rendered a Decision in favor of Kalayaan, rescinding the contract between the parties and ordering petitioners to vacate the premises.

Petitioners sought recourse from the CA. They aver that the CA failed to see that the original contract between petitioners and Kalayaan was altered, changed, modified and restricted as a consequence of the change in the person of the principal debtor (Sps. Valenzuela to Juliet). When Kalayaan agreed to a monthly amortization of P10,000.00 per month the original contract was changed, and that the same recognized Juliet’s capacity to pay and her designation as the new debtor. Nevertheless, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling.

Issue: If the original contract was novated and the principal obligation to pay for the remaining half of the subject property was transferred from petitioners to Juliet.

Held: No. Novation is never presumed. Novation is the extinguishment of an obligation by the substitution or change of the obligation by a subsequent one which extinguishes or modifies the first, either by changing the object or principal conditions, or by substituting another in place of the debtor, or by subrogating a third person in the rights of the creditor. Parties to a contract must expressly agree that they are abrogating their old contract in favor of a new one. In absence of an express agreement, novation takes place only when the old and new obligations are incompatible on every point.

These are the indispensable requisites of novation:

1) There must be a previous valid obligation;

2) There must be an agreement of the parties concerned to a new contract;

3) There must be the extinguishment of the old contract; and

4) There must be the validity of the new contract.

In the instant case, none of the aforementioned requisites are present, as Kalayaan never agreed to the creation of a new contract between them or Juliet. Kalayaan’s acceptance of the late payments made by Juliet is, at best, an act of tolerance on part of Kalayaan that could not have modified the contract.

The non-fulfillment by petitioners of their obligation to pay, which is a suspensive condition for the obligation of Kalayaan to sell and deliver the title to the property, rendered the Contract to Sell ineffective and without force and effect. The parties stand as if the conditional obligation had never existed; Kalayaan cannot be compelled to transfer ownership of the property to petitioners. 

Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado (G.R. No. 105371 November 11, 1993)

G.R. No. 105371 November 11, 1993

THE PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION, duly rep. by its President, BERNARDO P. ABESAMIS, Vice-President for Legal Affairs, MARIANO M. UMALI, Director for Pasig, Makati, and Pasay, Metro Manila, ALFREDO C. FLORES, and Chairman of the Committee on Legal Aid, JESUS G. BERSAMIRA, Presiding Judges of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 85, Quezon City and Branches 160, 167 and 166, Pasig, Metro Manila, respectively: the NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF THE JUDGES ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, composed of the METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT JUDGES ASSOCIATION rep. by its President. REINATO QUILALA of the MUNICIPAL TRIAL CIRCUIT COURT, Manila; THE MUNICIPAL JUDGES LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES rep. by its President, TOMAS G. TALAVERA; by themselves and in behalf of all the Judges of the Regional Trial and Shari'a Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal Courts throughout the Country, petitioners, 
vs.
HON. PETE PRADO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications, JORGE V. SARMIENTO, in his capacity as Postmaster General, and the PHILIPPINE POSTAL CORP., respondents.

Facts: Petitioners, members of the lower courts, are assailing the constitutionality of Sec 35 of RA 7354 due to, inter alia, its being discriminatory because of withdrawing the franking privilege from the Judiciary but retaining said privilege for the President, the VP, members of Congress, the Comelec, former Presidents, and the National Census and Statistics Office. Respondents counter that there is no discrimination as the franking privilege has also been withdrawn from the Office of Adult Education, the Institute of National Language, the Telecommunications Office, the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation, the National Historical Commission, the AFP, the AFP Ladies Steering Committee, the City and Provincial Prosecutors, the Tanodbayan (Office of the Special Prosecutor), the Kabataang Baranggay, the Commission on the Filipino Language, the Provincial and City Assessors, and the National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons.

Issue: Constitutionality of Sec. 35of RA 7354

Held: Hereby declared unconstitutional.

The EPC is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed, 12 Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others. The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or things without distinction. In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been withdrawn, Section 35 has placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and the members of Congress for the franking privilege, there is no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater need on the part of the Judiciary for such privilege. While we may appreciate the withdrawal of the franking privilege from the Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, we fail to understand why the Supreme Court should be similarly treated as that Committee.

In the SC’s view, the only acceptable reason for the grant of the franking privilege was the perceived need of the grantee for the accommodation, which would justify a waiver of substantial revenue by the Corporation in the interest of providing for a smoother flow of communication between the government and the people. If the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy, it seems to us, is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of government, including those who do not need it. The problem is not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others, especially where there is no substantial distinction between those favored, which may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem is not solved by violating the Constitution.

People vs. Burgos (G.R. No. L-68955 September 4, 1986)

G.R. No. L-68955 September 4, 1986

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 
vs.
RUBEN BURGOS y TITO, defendant-appellant.

Facts: Defendant is charged with illegal possession of firearm in furtherance of subversion (tasks such as recruiting members to the NPA and collection of contributions from its members) and found guilty by the RTC of Digos, Davao del Sur. From the information filed by the police authorities upon the information given by Masamlok, allegedly a man defendant tried to recruit into the NPA, the police authorities arrest defendant and had his house searched. Subsequently, certain NPA-related documents and a firearm, allegedly issued and used by one Alias Cmdr. Pol of the NPA, are confiscated. Defendant denies being involved in any subversive activities and claims that he has been tortured in order to accept ownership of subject firearm and that his alleged extrajudicial statements have been made only under fear, threat and intimidation on his person and his family. He avers that his arrest is unlawful as it is done without valid warrant, that the trial court erred in holding the search warrant in his house for the firearm lawful, and that the trial court erred in holding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of PD 9 in relation to GOs 6and 7.

Issue: If defendant’s arrest, the search of his home, and the subsequent confiscation of a firearm and several NPA-related documents are lawful.

Held: Records disclose that when the police went to defendant’s house to arrest him upon the information given by Masamlok, they had neither search nor arrest warrant with them—in wanton violation of ArtIV, Sec 3 (now Art III, sec 2). As the Court held in Villanueva vs Querubin, the state, however powerful, doesn’t have access to a man’s home, his haven of refuge where his individuality can assert itself in his choice of welcome and in the kind of objects he wants around him. In the traditional formulation, a man’s house, however humble, is his castle, and thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by the government.

The trial court justified the warrantless arrest under Rule 113 Sec 6 of the RoC:

a)          When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to commit an offense in his presence;

b)          When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed it;

c)          When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another

and the confiscation of the firearm under Rule 126, Sec 12:

A person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense.

However, the trial court has erred in its conclusion that said warrantless arrest is under the ambit of aforementioned RoC. At the time of defendant’s arrest, he wasn’t in actual possession of any firearm or subversive document, and was not committing any “subversive” act—he was plowing his field. It is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime in a warrantless arrest. An essential precondition is that a crime must have beenin fact or actually have been committed first; it isn’t enough to suspect a crime may have been committed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator. The Court also finds no compelling reason for the haste with which the arresting officers sought to arrest the accused. We fail to see why they failed to first go through the process of obtaining a warrant of arrest, if indeed they had reasonable ground to believe that the accused had truly committed a crime. There is no showing that there was a real apprehension that the accused was on the verge of flight or escape. Likewise, there is no showing that the whereabouts of the accused were unknown.

In proving the ownership of the questioned firearm and alleged subversive documents, assuming they were really illegal, the defendant was never informed of his constitutional rights at the time of his arrest; thus the admissions obtained are in violation of the constitutional right against self-incrimination under Sec 20 Art IV (now Sec 12, Art III) and thus inadmissible as evidence.

Furthermore, the defendant was not accorded his constitutional right to be assisted by counsel during the custodial interrogation. His extra-judicial confession, the firearm, and the alleged subversive documents are all inadmissible as evidence. In light of the aforementioned, defendant is acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt of the crime with which he has been charged. Subject firearm and alleged subversive documents have been disposed of in accordance with law.

The Court also maintains that violations of human rights do not help in overcoming a rebellion. Reiterating Morales vs Enrile, “while the government should continue to repel the communists, the subversives, the rebels, and the lawless with the means at its command, it should always be remembered that whatever action is taken must always be within the framework of our Constitution and our laws.”

Stonehill vs. Diokno

G.R. No. L-19550             June 19, 1967

HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL BECK, petitioners, 
vs.
HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in his capacity as Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST. FISCAL MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE HERMOGENES CALUAG, Court of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of Quezon City, respondents.

Facts: Petitioners, who have prior deportation cases pending, and the corporation they form were alleged to committed "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code,” to which they were served 4 search warrants, directing any peace officer to search petitioners’  persons and/or premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences for: “books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).”

The items allegedly illegally obtained can be classified into two groups: (1) those found and seized in the offices of aforementioned corporations, and (2) those found in petitioners’ residences.

Petitioners aver that the warrant is illegal for, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law x x x.

Respondent-prosecutors invoke the Moncado vs People’s Court ruling: even if the searches and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners herein.

Issue: Validity of the search warrants.

Held: The SC ruled in favor of Stonehill et. al., reversing the Moncado doctrine. Though Stonehill et. al. are not the proper parties to assail the validity of the search warrant issued against their corporation and thus they have no cause of action (only the officers or board members of said corporation may assail said warrant, and that corporations have personalities distinct from petitioners’ personalities), the 3 warrants issued to search petitioners’ residences are hereby declared void. Thus, the searches and seizures made therein are made illegal.

The constitution protects the people’s right against unreasonable search and seizure. It provides:

 (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and

 (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. 


In the case at bar, none of these are met.

 The warrant was issued from mere allegation that petitioners  committed a “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code.” As no specific violation has been alleged, it was impossible for the judges who issued said warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed or committed violations of the law. In other words, it would be a legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code,” — as alleged in the aforementioned applications — without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or codes. General warrants are also to be eliminated, as the legality or illegality of petitioners’ transactions is immaterial to the invalidity of the general warrant that sought these effects to be searched and seized: “Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss statements.”

The Court also holds that the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures is, in the language of the Federal Supreme Court:  x x x  If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his rights to be secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land. 

Ormoc Sugar Company Inc. vs Treasurer of Ormoc City

G.R. No. L-23794     February 17, 1968
ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. THE TREASURER OF ORMOC CITY, THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF ORMOC CITY, HON. ESTEBAN C. CONEJOS as Mayor of Ormoc City and ORMOC CITY, Defendants-Appellees.

Facts:

The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed a municipal tax ordinance imposing on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company Inc. one percent per export sale to the US and other foreign countries. Said company filed before the CFI of Leyte a complaint against the City of Ormoc, its Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor, alleging sasid ordinance is violative of the equal protection clause and the rule of uniformity of taxation, among other things.  Ormoc Sugar Company Inc. was the only sugar central in Ormoc City at the time.

Issue:

WON the constitutional limits on the power of taxation, specifically the EPC and uniformity of taxation, were infringed.

Held:

Yes. Though Ormoc Sugar Company Inc. is the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc at the time, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. Said ordinance shoouldn’t be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, for coverage of the tax.

EPC applies only to persons or things identically situated and doesn’t bar a reasonable classificationof the subject of legislation. A classification is reasonable where: 1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class.

Republic vs Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (GR No. L-21749, September 29, 1967)

Facts: A barge being towed by tugboats "Bangus" and "Barbero" all owned by Luzon Stevedoring Corp. rammed one of the wooden piles of the Nagtahan Bailey Bridge due to the swollen current of the Pasig after heavy rains days before. The Republic sued Luzon Stevedoring for actual and consequential damages. Luzon Stevedoring claimed it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees; that the damages to the bridge were caused by force majeure; that plaintiff has no capacity to sue; and that the Nagtahan bailey bridge is an obstruction to navigation.


Issue: Whether or not the collision of appellant's barge with the supports or piers of the Nagtahan bridge was in law caused by fortuitous event or force majeure.

Held: There is a presumption of negligence on part of the employees of Luzon Stevedoring, as the Nagtahan Bridge is stationary. For caso fortuito or force majeure (which in law are identical in so far as they exempt an obligor from liability) by definition, are extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable, "events that could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable" (Art. 1174, Civ. Code of the Philippines). It is, therefore, not enough that the event should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly believed, but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. The mere difficulty to foresee the happening is not impossibility to foresee the same. Luzon Stevedoring knew the perils posed by the swollen stream and its swift current, and voluntarily entered into a situation involving obvious danger; it therefore assured the risk, and can not shed responsibility merely because the precautions it adopted turned out to be insufficient. It is thus liable for damages. 

People vs. Bati (G.R. No. 87429, August 27, 1990)

Facts: By the word of their civilian informer, Patrolmen Jose Luciano, Angelito Caraan, Nelson Dimatulac and Democrito Cuenca immediately proceeded to the vicinity an alleged buy-and-sell of marijuana was taking place. They saw Marquez giving something to Bati, who, thereafter, handed a wrapped object, which turned out to be marijuana worth P190, to Marquez who then inserted the object inside the front of his pants in front of his abdomen while Bati, on his part, placed the thing given to him inside his pocket. Marquez was arrested on the spot. Both Bati and Marquez were brought to the Police station where they admitted they were in the buying and selling of the confiscated marijuana.

Issue: Appellant contends that the arrest was not valid as the requirements for a warrantless arrest were not complied with.

Held: This contention is without merit.

Section 5 Rule 113 of the Rules in Criminal Procedure clearly provides:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant, when lawful. — A peace officer or private person may, without warrant, arrest a person:

(a)            When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b)            When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it x x x

It is the considered view of the Court that there was no need for Luciano and Caraan to be armed with a warrant of arrest when they arrested Marquez and the accused since they had personal knowledge of the actual commission of the crime viz: They were eyewitnesses to the illegal exchange of marijuana and P190.00 between Marquez and accused who were caught in flagrante delicto. The facts and circumstances attendant precisely fall under Sec. 5, (a), Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. The subsequent arrest of Marquez and accused were made under the principle of "hot pursuit". The recovery of the marijuana from Marquez and the P190.00 from accused by the said police officers were not violative of their constitutional rights since Marquez and the accused voluntarily surrendered them to the police officers. But even for the sake of argument that the recovery of the marijuana and peso bills were against the consent of Marquez and accused, still, the search on their persons was incidental to their valid warrantless arrest. For, the rule that searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule. There are at least three exceptions: (1) search incidental to an arrest, (2) search of a moving vehicle and (3) seizure of evidence in plain view. In the case at bar, the searches made on Marquez and accused were incidental to their valid arrest.

Having caught the appellant in flagrante as a result of the buy-bust operation, the policemen were not only authorized but were also under obligation to apprehend the drug pusher even without a warrant of arrest And since appellant's arrest was lawful, it follows that the search made incidental to the arrest was also valid.

Supreme Court Poetry: The law is severe because those who are caught in the strangle hold of prohibited drugs not only slide into the ranks of the living dead, what is worse, they become a grave menace to the safety of the law-abiding members of society. 

People vs. Lol-lo and Saraw (G.R. No. 17958, February 27, 1922)

Facts: Pinirata nina Lol-lo, Saraw, at 22 iba pa na nakasakay sa anim na vinta ang dalawang barko kung saan nakasakay ang 11 Olandes sa karagatan ng Dutch East Indies. (Kalurky, hindi pa sila Indonesia! Ancient case is ancient!) Nagpanggap silang humihingi ng pagkain, at nang ma-board nila ang dalawang Olandes na barko, ninakawan, nambugbog, at nang-rape with methods "too horrible to be described." (HAHAHAHA na-offend ang quasi-Victorian sensibilities si Justice Malcolm!) Matapos nito'y iniwanan ng mga kups ang mga Olandes sa mga naturang barko na pinuncture na rin nila, but taking the two poor women with them. 

Pero animo'y hinabol rin sila ng hustisya, dahil nailigtas ang mga Olandes at eventually ay na-charge sina Lol-lo at Saraw sa CFI ng Sulu. (Hindi pa Sharia court. Char!) 

Issue: Jurisdiction ng CFI ng Sulu sa isang krimeng hindi naganap sa Pinas. 

Held: CFI of Sulu has jurisdiction. "'Pirates are in law hostes humani generis. Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind. It may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits. As it is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes.' (U.S. vs. Furlong [1820], 5 Wheat., 184.)

All of the elements of the crime of piracy are present. Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi, and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility." (Emphasis akin. Obviously. Hindi iyo. CHAR!)

Ibig sabihin, kahit nasaan ka sa mundo, CHAR!!! pag nag-feeling Bluebeard or Captain Jack Sparrow ka, or nakipag-conspire ka with Somali pirates, pwede kang kasuhan sa mga korte sa Pinas, or basically any nation na may laws sa piracy. 


Napaka-poetic na whatnot ng Korte: The days when pirates roamed the seas, when picturesque buccaneers like Captain Avery and Captain Kidd and Bartholomew Roberts gripped the imagination, when grostesque brutes like Blackbeard flourished, seem far away in the pages of history and romance. Nevertheless, the record before us tells a tale of twentieth century piracy in the south seas, but stripped of all touches of chivalry or of generosity, so as to present a horrible case of rapine and near murder.

Antero J. Pobre vs. Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago

Antero J. Pobre vs. Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, A.C. No. 7399 August 25, 2009

i.e., Miriam Baliw vs. Supreme Court of Idiots 

Facts: Sa kanyang privilege speech sa Senado, sinabi ni Senador Miriam Defensor-Santiago ang: 

I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots. 

Iniinvoke naman ng aking paboritong senador ang kanyang constitutional rights bilang isang miyembro ng Kongreso (parliamentary immunity). May mga nakatala (tulad ni Pobre) na ang pahayag na ito ng senadorang may kaunting tililing ay bunga ng hindi pag-a-appoint sa kanya bilang Chief Justice. 

Issue: Kung si Miriam Baliw ba ay administratively liable dahil sa pahayag niyang ito, at kung abuso ba ito ng kanyang mga karapatan bilang isang senador. 

Held: Baliw si Miriam at talagang baliw siya; bitter na bitter rin siya nang hindi siya naging Chief Justice. Lol. 

Eto seryoso na. 
Isinaad ng Korte Suprema na ang Senadora ay indeed, may constitutional rights na makikita sa Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution, which provides: “A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.” Ika ng Korte Suprema, isa ang free speech sa mga pundasyon ng demokrasya. 


Ngunit kahit may parliamentary rights siya na naka-mandate sa Konstitusyon, pinagalitan pa rin ng Korte Suprema ang senadora. 

The Court wishes to express its deep concern about the language Senator Santiago, a member of the Bar, used in her speech and its effect on the administration of justice. To the Court, the lady senator has undoubtedly crossed the limits of decency and good professional conduct. It is at once apparent that her statements in question were intemperate and highly improper in substance. 

Ayon na rin sa Korte Suprema, nasa Senado na ang opisyal na hatol kay Miriam Baliw, dahil Rules of the House ang kanyang nilabag. 
Huling hirit ng Korte Suprema:  It is unfortunate that her peers bent backwards and avoided imposing their own rules on her. i.e., #$%^&*&^%$#$%^&* dahil sa separation of powers, wala tayong magawa noong ininsulto tayo ng luka-lokang iyon dahil hindi natin siya saklaw. 
Nakanino ang huling halakhak?
"I lied." *hysterical laughter*

Lidasan v. Comelec

Bara Lidasan vs. Commission on Elections,21 SCRA 542

Facts:  RA 4790, entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur,” took effect on June 18, 1966. It sought to create the new municipality of Dianaton within barrios in Lanao del Sur, but also included barrios located in Cotabato. Bara Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato requested for certiorari and prohibition and declare RA 4790 as unconstitutional because its Title is misleading and invoked the provision of the Constitution that the title of a bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of the import of the single subject thereof.

Issue: Whether the title of RA 4790 "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur" satisfied the provision of the Constitution that the title of an act must be sufficient to notify the public and others concerned of its substance.

Decision:  RA4970, “An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur,” is deemed unconstitutional.  The very title projected the impression that Lanao del Sur is the only province affected by the act. This statute apprised neither Congress nor the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato that part of Cotabato’s territory is being taken to add to the adjacent Lanao del Sur. 

Dissenting opinion: Fernando, J.

The said provision of the Constitution must be construed liberally as this has been the general disposition in all courts, as opposed to the strict interpretation of the Supreme Court. Thus, the title of RA 4790 is sufficient to inform the public of its substance, namely, the creation of the Municipality of Dianaton in the province of Lanao del Sur.

Moy Ya Lim and Lau Yuen Yeung vs. The Commissioner of Immigration

Facts: Lau Yuen Yeung (tawagin na lang natin siyang Miss Lau) ay isang Chinese national mula Hong Kong na nag-apply ng temporary passport/visa noong Marso 13, 1961. Isang buwan lang ang bisa ng visa niya, bonded ng P1000. Ngunit noong Enero 25, 1962, isinaad ni Miss Lau na nagpakasal na siya kay Moy YaLim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, na isang Filipino citizen. Si Miss Lau ay hindi marunong magsalita, magsulat o magbasa ng Ingles, Tagalog o Espanol. 


Issue: Kung naging mamamayan na ba ng Pilipinas si Miss Lau dahil sa kanyang pagpapakasal sa isang mamamayan ng Pilipinas, si Moy Ya Lim. 


Held: Nasasaad sa batas (Commonwealth Act No. 473, section 15) na "any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines." 


Ayon sa Commissioner of Immigration, wala sa testimonya ni Miss Lau ang kahit na anong disqualification for naturalization na nakasaad sa Commonwealth Act No. 473, section 4.


Alinsunod sa tradisyong Pilipino tungkol sa pamilya, hindi maaari na ang asawang lalaki ay mamamayan ng Pilipinas at ang asawang babae ay hindi, at ang pagtrato sa dayuhan ay naiiba. 


Hindi porke't maaaring may umabuso sa batas na nakasaad sa itaas, ay pawawalambisahin na ang batas na ito. Kung magkakaroon man ng mga ganitong pangyayari ay lilitisin na lang accordingly. 

Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC

Imelda Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC and Cirilo Roy Montejo

Facts: Si Imelda Romualdez-Marcos ay isang ganid na pulitiko na tumakbo bilang kongresista ng Tolosa, Leyte, kung saan hindi siya nanirahan ng pitong buwan tulad ng nakasaaad sa batas. Naging residente siya ng Maynila at San Juan, kongresista ng Maynila, at minsan pa'y naging gubernador na rin ng Lungsod ng Maynila. Unang sinulat ni Imelda na siya ay residente ng Tolosa sa loob ng "seven months," ngunit by virtue ng "honest mistake" ay ni-recant niya ito at sinabing mula pagkabata niya ay residente siya ng Leyte: "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence."

Sa loob ng maraming taon bilang isang de-facto hegemon ng bansang ito, nagpalipat-lipat ang kanyang pagrerehistro bilang botante sa San Juan, Rizal at sa Maynila. 

Issue: Kung ang pagtakbo ni Imelda ay konstitusyonal, i.e., kung talaga bang residente siya ng Tolosa, dahil sa Leyte siya nag-aral ngunit lumipat ng Maynila noong pinakasalan niya si Makoy. 

Held: Ayon sa mayorya (4 sa 6 na hustisya), si Imelda Romualdez-Marcos ay maituturing na isang residente ng Tolosa, Leyte at for all purposes of goddamn elections ay maaari siyang tumakbo bilang kongresista ng lugar na ito. Ang kanyang mga "homes" at "residences" sa iba't-ibang parte ng Metro Manila ay temporaryo lamang. Siya ay isang domicile at legal resident ng Unang Distrito ng Leyte ayon sa batas. 

Ang kanyang "domicile of origin" ay kung saan domicile ang kanyang magulang. Hindi porke't nagpakasal siya kay Makoy na may maraming residences ay nawala na ang kanyang domicile of origin. At dahil sinulatan niya ang Chairman ng PCGG na gusto niyang "rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in Tacloban and Farm in Olot, Leyte. . . to make them livable for the Marcos family to have a home in our homeland." Noong 1992 rin ay nakakuha siya ng residencecertificate sa Tacloban, isang rason na sumusuporta na nais niyang manirahan sa Leyte. 

Irrelevant to the case yet funny stuff: "[I]n February 1986 (she claimed that) she and her family were abducted and kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii.

Frivaldo vs COMELEC

Juan Gallanosa Frivaldo v. COMELEC and the League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter, Herein Represented by its President, Salvador Nee Estuye

Facts: Nanalo bilang gobernador ng Sorsogon si Frivaldo noong Enero  22, 1988, ngunit nalaman ng League of Municipalities na siya'y isang naturalized American citizen noong Enero 20, 1983. Depensa ni Frivaldo: kinailangan niyang maging American citizen dahil sa paghabol sa kanya ng mga ahente ng Diktador. Bumalik siya sa Pilipinas matapos ang EDSA upang tumulong sa panunumbalik ng demokrasya sa bansa. 

Ayon sa COMELEC at sa Solicitor-General nito, si Frivaldo ay hindi mamamayan ng Pilipinas. Ayon sa batas, (Art. IX, Section 1 ng Konstitusyon; Section 117 ng Omnibus Election Code; Article V, Section 1 ng Konstitusyon), ang isang hindi mamamayan ng Pilipinas ay hindi maaaring maging botante ng Pilipinas, atbp.

Issue: W/N si Frivaldo ay isang mamamayan ng Pilipinas o hindi sa panahong nanalo siya bilang gobernador ng Sorsogon noong Enero 22, 1988. 

Held: Kups, hindi porke't natakot ka sa mga ahente ni Makoy noong nasa kapangyarihan pa siya ay maaari mo nang iwanan ang iyong pagkamamamayan AT matapos na siya'y mawala ay maging gobernador na lang nang hindi pa tinatalikuran ang pagiging American citizen mo. Maaari naman sanang naibalik ang pagiging mamamayan ng Pilipnas, sa pamamagitan ng isang direktang Act of Congress, ang proseso ng naturalisasyon, at repatriation. 

Dahil sa kanyang pagfo-forfeit ng kanyang American citizenship, ngunit hindi necessarily ang pag-reclaim ng kanyang Philippine citizenship, isa siyang stateless kups. Hindi porke't nanalo ang isang kups sa elesyon ay valid na mamamayan na siya ng Pinas.