People vs Marti

G.R. No. 81561 January 18, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
vs.
ANDRE MARTI, accused-appellant.

Facts: The proprietors of Manila Packing and Export Forwarders, following standard operating procedure, opened four gift wrapped boxes from which emerged a peculiar odor. They reported this to the NBI on the same day, and in the presence of said agents, opened the boxes which contained marijuana. The NBI filed an information against appellant for violation of RA 6425, Dangerous Drugs Act, but appellant contended that the evidence had been obtained in violation of consti rights against unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of communication.

Issue: May an act of a private individual without the intervention and participation of the State, and allegedly in violation of appellant’s constitutional rights, be invoked against the State?

Held: No. It was the proprietor of the forwarding agency who made search/inspection of the packages, not the NBI, as appellant would have the Court believe. Said inspection was reasonable and a standard operating procedure on the part of the proprietor as a precautionary measure before delivery of packages to the Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Posts. Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search the proprietor effected into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search.

Outlawed is any unwarranted intrusion by the government, which is called upon to refrain from any invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life. However, in the absence of governmental interference, the liberties granted by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State. As held in Bernas vs. US, the Fourth Amendment and the law applying to it do not require exclusion of evidence obtained through a search by a private citizen; rather the amendment only proscribes government action. To agree with appellant that an act of a private individual in violation of the Bill of Rights should also be construed as an act of the State would result in serious legal complications and an absurd interpretation of the constitution.

The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.

People vs Cayat

G.R. No. L-45987             May 5, 1939

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 
vs.
CAYAT, defendant-appellant

Facts:

Cayat was a native from Baguio, Benguet, Mt. Province who was found guilty of violation of Sections 2 and 3 of Act 1639: It shall be unlawful for any native of the Philippine Islands who is a member of a non-Christian tribe within the meaning of the Act Numbered Thirteen hundred and ninety-seven, to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of this Act, except as provided in section one hereof; and it shall be the duty of any police officer or other duly authorized agent of the Insular or any provincial, municipal or township government to seize and forthwith destroy any such liquors found unlawfully in the possession of any member of a non-Christian tribe.

SEC. 3. Any person violating the provisions of section one or section two of this Act shall, upon conviction thereof, be punishable for each offense by a fine of not exceeding two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, in the discretion of the court.

Issues:

1.      If  said law is discriminatory and denies EP of laws;

2.      If said law is an improper exercise of the police power of the state.

Held:

1.     Said statute does not deny EP of laws; the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. And the classification, to be reasonable:

a.      must rest on substantial distinctions;

b.      must be germane to the purposes of the law;

c.       must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

d.      must apply equally to all members of the same class.

Act 1639 meets all such requirements. The classification rests on real and substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon "accident of birth or parentage” but upon the degree of civilization and culture. "The term 'non-Christian tribes' refers, not to religious belief, but to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities.

When the public safety or the public morals require the discontinuance of a certain practice by certain class of persons, the hand of the Legislature cannot be stayed from providing for its discontinuance by any incidental inconvenience which some members of the class may suffer. The private interests of such members must yield to the paramount interests of the nation. The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as "an inferior or less capable race." On the contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the public policy towards them rest upon a recognition of their inherent right to equality in that enjoyment of those privileges now enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as there can be no true equality before the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in education, the government has endeavored, by appropriate measures, to raise their culture and civilization and secure for them the benefits of their progress, with the ultimate end in view of placing them with their Christian brothers on the basis of true equality.

The prohibition is germane to the purposes of the law. It is designed to insure peace and order in and among the non- Christian tribes has often resulted in lawlessness and crime thereby hampering the efforts of the government to raise their standards of life and civilization. This law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of the enactment. It is intended to apply for all times as long as those conditions exists. The Act applies equally to all members of the class. That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number of non- Christians by reason of their degree of culture is not an argument against the equality of its operation nor affect the reasonableness of the classification thus established.

2.      Said statute is not an improper exercise of the PPS. Any measure intended to promote the health, peace, morals, education, and good order of the people or to increase the industries of the state, develop its resources and add to its wealth and prosperity is legitimate exercise of police power, unless shown to be whimsical or capricious as to unduly interfere with the rights of an individual. Act 1639 is designed to promote peace and order to non-Christian tribes and to eventually hasten their equalization and unification with the rest of their Christian brothers.

Ormoc Sugar Company Inc. vs Treasurer of Ormoc City

G.R. No. L-23794     February 17, 1968
ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. THE TREASURER OF ORMOC CITY, THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF ORMOC CITY, HON. ESTEBAN C. CONEJOS as Mayor of Ormoc City and ORMOC CITY, Defendants-Appellees.

Facts:

The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed a municipal tax ordinance imposing on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company Inc. one percent per export sale to the US and other foreign countries. Said company filed before the CFI of Leyte a complaint against the City of Ormoc, its Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor, alleging sasid ordinance is violative of the equal protection clause and the rule of uniformity of taxation, among other things.  Ormoc Sugar Company Inc. was the only sugar central in Ormoc City at the time.

Issue:

WON the constitutional limits on the power of taxation, specifically the EPC and uniformity of taxation, were infringed.

Held:

Yes. Though Ormoc Sugar Company Inc. is the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc at the time, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. Said ordinance shoouldn’t be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, for coverage of the tax.

EPC applies only to persons or things identically situated and doesn’t bar a reasonable classificationof the subject of legislation. A classification is reasonable where: 1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class.

Republic vs Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (GR No. L-21749, September 29, 1967)

Facts: A barge being towed by tugboats "Bangus" and "Barbero" all owned by Luzon Stevedoring Corp. rammed one of the wooden piles of the Nagtahan Bailey Bridge due to the swollen current of the Pasig after heavy rains days before. The Republic sued Luzon Stevedoring for actual and consequential damages. Luzon Stevedoring claimed it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees; that the damages to the bridge were caused by force majeure; that plaintiff has no capacity to sue; and that the Nagtahan bailey bridge is an obstruction to navigation.


Issue: Whether or not the collision of appellant's barge with the supports or piers of the Nagtahan bridge was in law caused by fortuitous event or force majeure.

Held: There is a presumption of negligence on part of the employees of Luzon Stevedoring, as the Nagtahan Bridge is stationary. For caso fortuito or force majeure (which in law are identical in so far as they exempt an obligor from liability) by definition, are extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable, "events that could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable" (Art. 1174, Civ. Code of the Philippines). It is, therefore, not enough that the event should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly believed, but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. The mere difficulty to foresee the happening is not impossibility to foresee the same. Luzon Stevedoring knew the perils posed by the swollen stream and its swift current, and voluntarily entered into a situation involving obvious danger; it therefore assured the risk, and can not shed responsibility merely because the precautions it adopted turned out to be insufficient. It is thus liable for damages. 

People vs. Bati (G.R. No. 87429, August 27, 1990)

Facts: By the word of their civilian informer, Patrolmen Jose Luciano, Angelito Caraan, Nelson Dimatulac and Democrito Cuenca immediately proceeded to the vicinity an alleged buy-and-sell of marijuana was taking place. They saw Marquez giving something to Bati, who, thereafter, handed a wrapped object, which turned out to be marijuana worth P190, to Marquez who then inserted the object inside the front of his pants in front of his abdomen while Bati, on his part, placed the thing given to him inside his pocket. Marquez was arrested on the spot. Both Bati and Marquez were brought to the Police station where they admitted they were in the buying and selling of the confiscated marijuana.

Issue: Appellant contends that the arrest was not valid as the requirements for a warrantless arrest were not complied with.

Held: This contention is without merit.

Section 5 Rule 113 of the Rules in Criminal Procedure clearly provides:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant, when lawful. — A peace officer or private person may, without warrant, arrest a person:

(a)            When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b)            When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it x x x

It is the considered view of the Court that there was no need for Luciano and Caraan to be armed with a warrant of arrest when they arrested Marquez and the accused since they had personal knowledge of the actual commission of the crime viz: They were eyewitnesses to the illegal exchange of marijuana and P190.00 between Marquez and accused who were caught in flagrante delicto. The facts and circumstances attendant precisely fall under Sec. 5, (a), Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. The subsequent arrest of Marquez and accused were made under the principle of "hot pursuit". The recovery of the marijuana from Marquez and the P190.00 from accused by the said police officers were not violative of their constitutional rights since Marquez and the accused voluntarily surrendered them to the police officers. But even for the sake of argument that the recovery of the marijuana and peso bills were against the consent of Marquez and accused, still, the search on their persons was incidental to their valid warrantless arrest. For, the rule that searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule. There are at least three exceptions: (1) search incidental to an arrest, (2) search of a moving vehicle and (3) seizure of evidence in plain view. In the case at bar, the searches made on Marquez and accused were incidental to their valid arrest.

Having caught the appellant in flagrante as a result of the buy-bust operation, the policemen were not only authorized but were also under obligation to apprehend the drug pusher even without a warrant of arrest And since appellant's arrest was lawful, it follows that the search made incidental to the arrest was also valid.

Supreme Court Poetry: The law is severe because those who are caught in the strangle hold of prohibited drugs not only slide into the ranks of the living dead, what is worse, they become a grave menace to the safety of the law-abiding members of society. 

People vs. Lol-lo and Saraw (G.R. No. 17958, February 27, 1922)

Facts: Pinirata nina Lol-lo, Saraw, at 22 iba pa na nakasakay sa anim na vinta ang dalawang barko kung saan nakasakay ang 11 Olandes sa karagatan ng Dutch East Indies. (Kalurky, hindi pa sila Indonesia! Ancient case is ancient!) Nagpanggap silang humihingi ng pagkain, at nang ma-board nila ang dalawang Olandes na barko, ninakawan, nambugbog, at nang-rape with methods "too horrible to be described." (HAHAHAHA na-offend ang quasi-Victorian sensibilities si Justice Malcolm!) Matapos nito'y iniwanan ng mga kups ang mga Olandes sa mga naturang barko na pinuncture na rin nila, but taking the two poor women with them. 

Pero animo'y hinabol rin sila ng hustisya, dahil nailigtas ang mga Olandes at eventually ay na-charge sina Lol-lo at Saraw sa CFI ng Sulu. (Hindi pa Sharia court. Char!) 

Issue: Jurisdiction ng CFI ng Sulu sa isang krimeng hindi naganap sa Pinas. 

Held: CFI of Sulu has jurisdiction. "'Pirates are in law hostes humani generis. Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind. It may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits. As it is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes.' (U.S. vs. Furlong [1820], 5 Wheat., 184.)

All of the elements of the crime of piracy are present. Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi, and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility." (Emphasis akin. Obviously. Hindi iyo. CHAR!)

Ibig sabihin, kahit nasaan ka sa mundo, CHAR!!! pag nag-feeling Bluebeard or Captain Jack Sparrow ka, or nakipag-conspire ka with Somali pirates, pwede kang kasuhan sa mga korte sa Pinas, or basically any nation na may laws sa piracy. 


Napaka-poetic na whatnot ng Korte: The days when pirates roamed the seas, when picturesque buccaneers like Captain Avery and Captain Kidd and Bartholomew Roberts gripped the imagination, when grostesque brutes like Blackbeard flourished, seem far away in the pages of history and romance. Nevertheless, the record before us tells a tale of twentieth century piracy in the south seas, but stripped of all touches of chivalry or of generosity, so as to present a horrible case of rapine and near murder.

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